

Deliverable D2.5

Specification of the Cloud Security Certification Language – v3

Editor(s):	Marinella Petrocchi, Michela Fazzolari
Responsible Partner:	Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR)
Status-Version:	Final – v1.0
Date:	30.04.2023
Distribution level (CO, PU):	PU



Project Number:	952633
Project Title:	MEDINA

Title of Deliverable:	Specification of the Cloud Security Certification Language – v3
Due Date of Delivery to the EC	30.04.2023

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Recommended/mandatory readers:	WP2, WP3, WP4, WP5, WP6	

Abstract:	This is the last of the three deliverables resulting from
	Task 2.3, Task 2.4 and Task 2.5.
	This set of deliverables presents the definition and
	implementation of the Cloud Certification Language
	which encompasses three major phases: 1) the encoding
	of requirements of cloud certification schemas – written
	in natural language in a Controlled Natural Language
	(CNL), so called MEDINA CNL; 2) the editing of the
	requirements in MEDINA CNL through an editor tool; and
	3) the mapping of the CNL requirements to a domain
	specific language (DSL).
Keyword List:	MEDINA Cloud Certification Language, MEDINA CNL, CNL
	Editor, Domain Specific Language, DSL Mapper, MEDINA
	Ontology
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		Modifications Introduced	
Version D	Date	Modification Reason	Modified by
v0.1	02.03.2023	Creation and ToC	Michela Fazzolari
v0.2	15.03.2023	ToC approved by partners	All
v0.3	23.03.2023	CNL Editor and Appendix D.2 updated	Patrizia Ciampoli
v0.4	24.03.2023	Introduction updated Section 2 moved to Appendix E NL2CNL Translator updated	Michela Fazzolari, Immanuel Kunz
v0.5	27.03.2023	DSL Mapper updated Executive summary updated Conclusions updated Added component cards	Michela Fazzolari
v0.6	11.04.2023	First round of review	Marinella Petrocchi
v0.7	12.04.2023	Component cards of NL2CNL Translator and DSL Mapper updated	Michela Fazzolari
v0.8	14.04.2023	QA Internal Review	Juncal Alonso
v0.9	17.03.2023	Changes applied as requested upon internal review	All
v1.0	30.04.2023	Ready for submission	Cristina Martínez

Document Description

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Terms and abbreviations

API	Application Programming Interface
BNF	Backus-Naur Form
CCL	Cloud Certification Language
CNL	
CNL CNL4DSA	Controlled Natural Language Controlled Natural Language for Data Sharing Agreement
CRSO	Cloud Resource Security Ontology
CRUD	Create, Read, Update, Delete
CSA or EU CSA	Cybersecurity Act
CSP	Cloud Service Provider
DB	Data Base
DCG	Discounted Cumulative Gain
DoA	Description of Action
DSL	Domain Specific Language
EC	European Commission
EUCS	European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services
GA	Grant Agreement to the project
GUI	Graphical User Interface
GWT	Google Web Toolkit
laaS	Infrastructure as a Service
ICT	Information Communications Technology
IDCG	Ideal Discounted Cumulative Gain
JSON	JavaScript Object Notation
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
MTS	Modal Transition System
nDCG	Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain
NL	Natural Language
NLP	Natural Language Processing
NL2CNL	Natural Language To Controlled Natural Language
OPA	Open Policy Engine
P@k	Precision at k
PaaS	Platform as a Service
PCA	Principal Component Analysis
RDF	Resource Description Framework
REO	Requirement & Obligations
REST	Representational State Transfer
RS	Requirements Specifications
SaaS	Software as a Service
SVD	Singular Value Decomposition
STRIDE	Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of
STRIDE	Service, and Elevation of Privilege
SW	Software
ТоС	Target of Certification
ТОМ	Technical and Organizational Measure
TRL	Technology Readiness Level
TSNE	T-distributed Stochastic Neighborhood Embedding
TSVD	Truncated Singular Value Decomposition
UI	User Interface
UML	Unified Modelling Language

UUI	Unified User Interface	
WF	Workflow	
XACML	eXtensible Access Control Markup Language	
XML	Extensible Markup Language	



Executive Summary

The ultimate goal of the MEDINA project is to develop a framework for achieving continuous audit-based certification for Cloud Service Providers based on cybersecurity certification schemes. Within this framework, the purposes of Work Package 2 "Certification Metrics and Languages" are:

- Elicitation of security controls and measures that are useful for automatic and continuous monitoring (Task 2.1).
- Definition of Technical and Organizational Measures (TOMs) and Security Metrics relevant for the continuous certification of Cloud Service Providers (CSP) (Task 2.2).
- Definition and implementation of a specification for Cloud Security Certification in a Controlled Natural Language (CNL) (Task 2.3).
- Definition and implementation of a tool that allows users to modify part of the policies elicited for security controls (Task 2.4).
- Definition and implementation of a tool that can translate the generated CNL to an enforceable machine-oriented Domain Specification Language (DSL) (Task 2.5).
- Development of a framework for defining the risks of the controls identified in Task 2.1 (Task 2.6).

In deliverable D2.1 [1] a preliminary comparative analysis of four certification schemes was carried out, along with a mapping of the controls of the schemes. The goal of this mapping is to provide guidance in the transitioning toward the EUCS candidate scheme (European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services) [2]. For this reason, Work Package 2 "Certification Metrics and Languages" has focused on part of the security controls and requirements included in the EUCS.

This deliverable (D2.5) is a public report that describes the progress made and the results achieved in the last six months of WP2 (from November 2022 to April 2023, included) for Tasks 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, so-called "Cloud Certification Language" tasks. This is the third deliverable of the series, the first version being the deliverable D2.3 [3], namely "Specification of the Cloud Security Certification Language – v1", and the second version being D2.4 "Specification of the Cloud Security Certification Language – v2" [4].

The main aim of this deliverable is to provide a toolset that renders the security requirements of the chosen certification schema, which are expressed in Natural Language (NL), into a language that can be automatically executed by a machine. To achieve this objective, two sequential translations are made: the first from NL to Controlled Natural Language (CNL), the second from CNL to Domain Specific Language (DSL).

The first translation from NL to CNL allows a security requirement to be represented with security policies expressed in a formal intermediate language, still understandable for a human user. The translation of a requirement is the aim of Task 2.3, and it is realized through a component called *NL2CNL Translator*, described in section 2.

The output of the *NL2CNL Translator* can be checked and modified by an experienced user, and this is performed in Task 2.4, where the output of Task 2.3 can be inspected through a dedicated tool, named *CNL Editor*, described in section 3.

Once the user is satisfied with the CNL policies, the second translation can take place. This translation is called `mapping' and aims at transforming policies from CNL into DSL. The output of the mapping is the main outcome of Task 2.5, and it is implemented by the *DSL Mapper*, described in section 4.

The structure of this document is quite straightforward, including three sections to detail the *NL2CNL Translator*, the *CNL Editor* and the *DSL Mapper*, and a brief final section that reports on the first stage of the final validation of the components.

For each component, the document describes its purpose and scope, the final coverage of MEDINA requirements, the internal architecture of the component and its subcomponents, the relation to other components, the implementation and technical details of the component, including programming languages and libraries used, information on packaging and installation, and licensing. Moreover, the advancements with respect to the previous release of the components in month 24 are highlighted.

The components presented hereafter are in their final state of implementation and have been fully integrated with other components of the MEDINA framework. All component requirements are fully implemented.

1 Introduction

1.1 About this deliverable

This document describes the result of Tasks 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, obtained during the last six months of WP2 (from November 2022 to April 2023, included). It reports on the internal design and on the final implementation state of the tools involved in the "Cloud Security Certification Language". The main aim is to translate the EUCS draft candidate cloud certification scheme [2] from Natural Language to a machine-readable language. The EUCS requirements, together with the associated metrics, can be seen as policies, i.e., rules that a Cloud Service Provider may/must fulfil in order to obtain the certification. The expression of these rules in the MEDINA DSL will allow the *MEDINA Evidence Management Tools* (presented in deliverables D3.3 [5] and D3.6 [6]) to process them automatically. More detailed information on the "Cloud Security Certification Language" can be found in *APPENDIX A: The Cloud Certification Language, Architecture, Sequence Diagram and Coverage of Requirements.*

This is the third deliverable on this topic, being the previous one the deliverable D2.4 [4]. The original structure of deliverable D2.4 has been slightly modified. Since the content of the current deliverable is closely related to that described in the previous one, for the reader's convenience, we have included in the appendices those parts of deliverable D2.4 necessary for understanding some of the concepts referred to here, in order to provide a self-contained deliverable that facilitates the reader's understanding.

1.2 Document Structure

This document is structured as follows:

- Section 1 is the current section.
- Section 2 describes the NL2CNL Translator component. It is the main output of Task 2.3 and implements the translation of policies from Natural Language (NL) to CNL, after associating a set of policies to a requirement. The output generated by this component is a set of policies (better-said obligations) expressed in CNL.
- Section 3 details the output of Task 2.4, i.e., the CNL Editor component. This tool allows a user to inspect and partly modify the obligations generated within the previous step.
- Section 4 describes the DSL Mapper, which is the outcome of Task 2.5. This component maps the obligations expressed in CNL into the MEDINA DSL, whose statements are machine-readable.
- Section 5 draws some conclusions.
- APPENDIX A: The Cloud Certification Language, Architecture, Sequence Diagram and Coverage of Requirements, describes the motivation and the methodology followed to design and develop the Cloud Security Certification Language system. It also recalls the architecture, sequence diagrams and coverage of requirements for the Cloud Certification Language components.
- APPENDIX B: Patterns and Controlled Natural Languages for Requirements specifications, describes the state-of the-art on Controlled Natural Languages and the MEDINA Controlled Natural Language.
- APPENDIX C: From NL to CNL TOMs, describes the strategies explored to perform the association between metrics and requirements.
- APPENDIX D: MEDINA Vocabularies and Ontologies, describes the MEDINA vocabularies and ontologies.

1.3 Updates from D2.4

This section summarises the main updates over the different sections of the document, considering that it is an evolution of D2.4 [4].

Section	Change		
2	Old section 2 (Cloud Security Certification Language Tool High-Level Architecture) has been moved to Appendix E. This section currently describes the NL2CNL Translator component in its final version.		
3	This section currently describes the CNL Editor component in its final version.		
4	This section currently describes the DSL Mapper component in its final version.		
5	Conclusions are aligned.		
Appendix A	Appendix including the same content of Appendix A of D2.4, in which the motivation and methodology of the Cloud Certification Language are described and the old section 2 of D2.4, with the description of the high-level architecture and sequence diagram of the Cloud Certification Language components.		
Appendix B	Appendix already present in D2.4, describing the MEDINA Controlled Natural Language defined for the specification of requirements.		
Appendix C	Appendix already present in D2.4, reporting a detailed study about possible strategies to associate metrics to requirements.		
Appendix D	Appendix with some updates with respect to the same Appendix in D2.4 showing MEDINA vocabularies and ontologies.		

Table 1. Overview of deliverable updates with respect to D2.4	4
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We have also added a new subsection, called 'Component Card', in the 'Implementation' section of each component's description. It includes a schematic table with the main functionalities of the component, subcomponents, sequence diagrams, interfaces, etc., providing the structural and behavioural description of the component itself. The template and contents of this table have been inherited from deliverable D5.2 [7].

2 NL2CNL Translator

The *NL2CNL Translator* is a component of the MEDINA framework that has two main purposes. The first goal is to select a set of metrics that could be useful to evaluate a certain security requirement, also called TOM (Technical and Organizational Measure). After associating a set of metrics to a requirement, the second goal is to translate those metrics into policies. Specifically, metrics are expressed in NL, while the translated policies are expressed in CNL. More information regarding CNLs in general and the specific CNL chosen for the MEDINA project can be found in the *APPENDIX B: Patterns and Controlled Natural Languages for Requirements specifications*, while *APPENDIX C: From NL to CNL TOMs* describes the strategies explored to perform the association between metrics and requirements.

2.1 Implementation

2.1.1 Functional description

The *NL2CNL Translator* relies on the *Catalogue of Controls and Metrics* component as a data source, in fact both the security requirements (aka TOMs) and metrics are stored in it. A first version of the Catalogue was described in D2.1 [1], while the last version has been described in D2.2 [8]. Currently, the focus of the *Catalogue* is on the EUCS candidate scheme (European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services [2]), in its draft version of August 2022.

In order to be evaluated, the requirements available in the EUCS scheme must be associated with metrics, and these metrics, in turn, can be expressed by means of obligation policies¹. The ultimate goal of the *NL2CNL Translator* is to translate a set of metrics associated to a requirement into obligations, expressed in CNL.

Main innovation: The main innovation introduced by the *NL2CNL Translator* is the use of a Metric Recommender based on NLP techniques to automatically associate a set of metrics to a requirement.

2.1.1.1 Fitting into overall MEDINA Architecture

Figure 1 shows the integration of the *NL2CNL Translator* within the overall MEDINA architecture. The components available are described in detail in section 2.1.2.1 and are mapped to the MEDINA framework as follows:

- The **API Server** component coordinates all the other modules and implements the API interface towards the outside.
- The **Metric Recommender** component implements the functionalities offered by the Metric Recommender in the MEDINA framework, i.e., it associates a requirement with a set of metrics.
- The **Translation** component implements the functionalities of translating the set of metrics in obligations, from NL to CNL.

The *NL2CNL Translator* interacts with the *Catalogue of controls and metrics*, which is its main source of data since it contains requirements, metrics descriptions and metadata. The results of the translation are created according to the MEDINA Ontology and then stored in the CNL Store, a database managed by the *CNL Editor* that is accessible though the *CNL Editor* APIs. Moreover,

¹ As reported in *APPENDIX B: Patterns and Controlled Natural Languages for Requirements specifications,* the MEDINA CNL language can express both authorizations and obligations. For the requirements investigated within EUCS, we have so far only considered obligations.

the *NL2CNL Translator* interacts also with the *Orchestrator*, which triggers the translation through its User Interface.






Figure 1. Position of the NL2CNL Translator within the MEDINA architecture (source: D5.2 [7])



2.1.1.2 Component card

Component Name	NL2CNL Translator				
Main functionalities	The component translates the natural language text (English) of Security Requirements (TOMs) to the CNL obligations by recommending/predicting a set of metrics and integrating them into the CNL.				
	 API Server: Implements the API interface towards other MEDINA components and coordinates all the operations and the connections towards other internal subcomponents. Metric Recommender: Given a requirement, it performs the association between the requirement and metrics. 				
Sub- components Description	Translation : Takes a requirement and the associated set of metrics and translates everything into a REO object (Requirements&Obligations), which includes the requirement's metadata and the metrics translated into obligations.				
	Obligation: RT must M type (op, tv) RT: resource type, M: metric associated to the requirement, tv: target value, op: comparison operator (indicates how to compare the target value with the value measured on the resource), type: unit of measure of the target value and the measured value.				
Main logical	Interface name	Description	Interface technology		
Interfaces	API Server	API to access NL2CNL functionalities	REST API		
Requirements Mapping		List of requirements covered by this component (see D5.2 [7]): NL2CNL.01, NL2CNL.02, NL2CNL.03, NL2CNL.04			
Interaction with other components	Interfacing Component Catalogue of controls and metrics CNL Editor API	Interface Description NL2CNL Translator reads re metrics from it. NL2CNL Translator exploits access the CNL Store function the requirements and oblig XML format.	CNL Editor API to onalities, i.e., to store		
Relevant sequence diagram/s	Compliance Manager using unified UI select requirements	Catalogue Metric Recomm.	omm		
Current TRL ²	TRL4				

² TRL value before validation

Target TRL ³	TRL5
Programming language	Python 3.8
License	Apache License 2.0
WP and task	WP2, Task 2.3
MEDINA Workflow	WF3 – EUCS deployment on ToC (see D5.4 [9])

2.1.1.3 Requirements

A collection of functional requirements (from deliverable D5.2 [7]) related to the component is presented below, along with a description of how and to what extent these requirements are implemented at the time of writing.

Requirement id	NL2CNL.01		
Short title	Translation from natural language to controlled natural language		
Description	The tool shall be able to translate in a semi-automatic way the requirements selected from a security certification scheme – originally expressed in natural language (English), into a set of obligations expressed in a controlled natural language. The output of the tool will be checked manually to verify if the obligations generated by the tool are correctly linked to the selected requirement.		
Implementation	Fully implemented		
state			

The *NL2CNL Translator* associates a set of metrics to each selected requirement, by using the Metric Recommender, and then translates all the associated metrics into obligations. Due to some limits in the accuracy results of the Metric Recommender, it is possible that some of the associated obligations are not suitable for the selected requirement, thus it is necessary to manually verify the output. In the final implementation, the *NL2CNL Translator* has been tested to correctly generate CNL obligations for all the requirements included in the *Catalogue of controls and metrics*.

Requirement id	NL2CNL.02		
Short title	Based on NLP and ontologies		
Description	Given natural language sentences taken from the cloud certification schema, the tool will rely on NLP techniques to link these sentences to a list of recommended metrics.		
Implementation	Fully implemented		
state			

The *NL2CNL Translator* relies on the Metric Recommender to choose which are the metrics to be associated to a requirement. This association is done by considering the text similarity among the requirement description and the metrics descriptions, both expressed in NL.

Requirement id	NL2CNL.03	
Short title	Translation of organizational measures and technical measures	
Description	The NL2CNL Translator will be able to translate some of the organizational measures specified in the chosen EU cloud certification schemas, and some of the technical measures.	

³ TRL value after validation

Implementation	Fully implemented
state	

The NL2CNL Translator is currently able to process all the EUCS requirements identified in D2.2 [8], which are the ones available in the *Catalogue of controls and metrics*.

Requirement id	NL2CNL.04		
Short title	Compliant with the CNL editor format		
Description	The controlled natural language output of the <i>NL2CNL Translator</i> will be compliant with the format used by the <i>CNL Editor</i> to represent the obligations.		
Implementation	Fully implemented		
state			

The *NL2CNL Translator* produces an object containing the requirement's metadata, metrics metadata and CNL obligations. All this information is stored in an XML file, compliant with the format used by the *CNL Editor*. The XML format has been updated to consider the Authorization&Filtering concept, i.e., to store the ID of the Cloud Service for which the translations are requested.

Requirement id	NL2CNL.05		
Short title	XML Compliant		
Description	The controlled natural language output of NL2CNL translator will be		
	compliant with the XML based format supported by the CNL Editor.		
Implementation	Discarded		
state			

This requirement has been cancelled since it duplicates requirement NL2CNL.04.

2.1.2 Technical description

In the following, we provide the technical description of the *NL2CNL Translator* subcomponents. First, we present the architectural design, consisting of the architectural view and the connection between the respective subcomponents. This is followed by information on the individual subcomponents and finally by a summary of the technical specifications for the implementation of the *NL2CNL Translator*.

2.1.2.1 Component architecture

The *NL2CNL translator* is written in Python 3 and is organized in modules. Its functionalities are available through a REST API; thus, a Python API framework has been chosen for implementing it, i.e., FastAPI⁴. This is a very fast and high-performance Python framework, which supports a compact coding structure, resulting in fast development.

FastAPI is based on the *asyncio* capabilities of Python⁵, which has been standardized as ASGI (Asynchronous Server Gateway Interface) specification⁶ for building asynchronous web applications. In terms of features, FastAPI is similar to Flask⁷, another widespread Python framework for writing APIs.

Figure 2 shows the architecture of the *NL2CNL Translator*.

⁴ <u>https://fastapi.tiangolo.com/</u>

⁵ <u>https://docs.python.org/3/library/asyncio.html</u>

⁶ https://asgi.readthedocs.io/en/latest/specs/main.html

⁷ <u>https://flask.palletsprojects.com/en/2.2.x/</u>




Figure 2. Overview of the NL2CNL Translator architecture

The *NL2CNL Translator* modules are organized into three subcomponents, according to the functionalities they offer:

- **API Server**: Implements the API interface towards other MEDINA components. Moreover, it coordinates all the operations and the connections towards other internal subcomponents.
- **Metric Recommender**: Given a requirement, it performs the association between the requirement and metrics, thus it provides a set of metrics.
- **Translation**: Takes a requirement and the associated set of metrics and translates everything into a REO object (Requirements&Obligations), which includes the requirement's metadata and the metrics translated into obligations. This object is then returned to the server.

The endpoints available to interact with the other MEDINA components are reported in Table 2.

Function name	Parameters	Return Type	Description
create_reo_from _requirement	username, cloud_servi ce_id, tom_code	HTTP Response	This function is designed to be called by the <i>Orchestrator</i> , which must transmit three parameters: the username of the user currently connected to MEDINA, the identifier of the Cloud Service, and the identifier of the requirement with which the metrics and related obligations are to be associated.
			This is a POST function, thus if the execution is successful the final effect will be the creation of a REO object within the CNL Store of the <i>CNL Editor</i> . If successful, the status code returned will be of type 201, otherwise an error code will be returned depending on the problem occurred (e.g., status code 401 is returned if the specified user does not have sufficient permissions).
livez	None	HTTP Response	This function is used by the Kubernetes primary node agent to know when to restart a container. In fact, many applications running for long periods of time eventually transition to broken states and cannot recover except by being restarted.
readyz	None	HTTP Response	This function is used by the Kubernetes primary node agent to know when a container is ready to start accepting traffic.

Table 2 list a	f available endnoint	for the NU 2CNU	Translator component
TUDIE Z. LIST O	j avallable enapolint.	JOI THE NEZCINE	Translator component

2.1.2.2 Description of components

This section presents the subcomponents available in the *NL2CNL Translator* and describes how they have been updated to meet the MEDINA requirements.

API Server

The API Server is the core of the *NL2CNL Translator*. It connects and coordinates with all the other services/components and implements the API interfaces provided to the outside. Its logic can be divided into 5 steps:

1. Upon launching the app, the API server loads the textual descriptions of requirements and metrics from the *Catalogue of controls and metrics*. In addition, the pre-computed numerical features for these texts are loaded from local files. Using pre-computed features has pros and cons. The main advantage lies in the fact that features computation is time consuming, and thus by computing features offline the app starting is faster. The disadvantage is that when a new requirement or metric is added to the *Catalogue of controls and metrics*, the corresponding feature vector for that element must be computed and the app restarted to load the changes. The set of requirements to work on has been set by the consortium, and we do not expect an extended set to be

considered from month 30 until the end of the project. However, we feel it is important to have provided a proof of concept based on numerical features of the texts.

- 2. The Metric Recommender is then initialized with the K-d tree algorithm⁸, computed on the feature vectors of the metrics.
- 3. After the preliminary steps, the API server waits for requests from the *Orchestrator* component. The *Orchestrator* starts a translation by calling the API server and passing the identifier of a requirement, a username and a Cloud Service identifier. The API server then calls the Metric Recommender to get the association between a requirement and a set of metrics.
- 4. These metrics are then translated into obligations, i.e., for each metric associated to a requirement, an obligation is constructed in XML language, using the metrics metadata previously loaded from the *Catalogue of controls and metrics*. The obligations expressed in XML are then embedded into a larger object called REO, which includes requirement's metadata, metrics metadata and the obligations themselves.
- 5. Finally, the object thus created is saved into the CNL Store, using the APIs provided by the *CNL Editor*.

Metric Recommender

The Metric Recommender is initialized with a K-dimensional tree (K-d tree) algorithm. The Metric Recommender takes the identifier of a requirement so that it can access the correspondent textual description. Next, the correspondent feature vector is retrieved and used as input for the K-d tree algorithm to select the k closest neighbours of the query vector based on the shortest Euclidean distance. Finally, the Metric Recommender returns a set of metrics whose features are the most similar to those of the specified requirement.

Translation

The Translation takes care of translating the metrics into obligations, moreover it generates an object compliant with the input required by the *CNL Editor*. This object is called REO (Requirements&Obligations), since it contains all the information needed to express a requirement and the associated obligations. The REO structure is depicted in Figure 5.

Once the object is created, the control returns to the API Server subcomponent.

2.1.2.3 Technical specifications

The *NL2CNL Translator* is written in Python, version 3.8. A selection of the key libraries is shown in the following and a full list including all the used libraries can be found in the GitLab repository⁹.

- fastapi
- uvicorn
- scipy
- scikit learn
- fasttext
- numpy
- pandas
- spacy
- nltk

 ⁸ Bentley, J. L. (1975). "Multidimensional binary search trees used for associative searching". Communications of the ACM. 18 (9): 509–517.
 ⁹ <u>https://git.code.tecnalia.com/medina/public/nl2cnl-translator</u>

• python-keycloak

2.2 Delivery and Usage

The following subsections give a short overview of the delivery and usage of the *NL2CNL Translator* prototype.

2.2.1 Package information

The package is delivered in a repository, containing all the needed deployment and configuration scripts for installing the *NL2CNL Translator*. Even if the component is not intended to be used as a standalone tool, it is possible to use it for testing purposes, mainly accessing the APIs through a web browser. The component is available as a Docker image. Table 3 shows the structure of the most important folders and a brief description of them.

Folder/file	Description
api_server.py	This file contains the code needed for implementing the APIs and for managing the communication between components.
Dockerfile	This file contains the list of commands that the Docker client calls while creating an image.
config.py	This file includes all the configurations (variables, paths, etc.) used by the prototype.
clean_sentence.py	This file belongs to the Metric Recommender. It is used to pre- process the textual description of requirements and metrics.
fasttext_features.py	This file belongs to the Metric Recommender. It is used to pre- compute the numerical features for the textual descriptions using the fasttext library.
utils.py	This file belongs to the Metric Recommender and implements its logic.
app_utils/	This folder includes a set of utility functions.
cnl_editor_client/	This folder contains the client to interact with the CNL Editor component.
coc_backend_api_client/	This folder contains the client to interact with the <i>Catalogue of Controls and Metrics</i> component.
data/	This folder contains local data used by the <i>NL2CNL Translator</i> , such as the pre-computed features for requirements and metrics and the XML templates to build the REO objects.
openapis/	This folder contains the auto-generated OpenAPI files.

Table 3. Most important files and folders implementing the NL2CNL Translator

2.2.2 Installation instructions

The full up-to-date installation instructions of the *NL2CNL Translator* can be found in the README in the MEDINA GitLab repository at this link:

https://git.code.tecnalia.com/medina/public/nl2cnl-translator/-/blob/main/README.md

To setup the prototype in a local machine, it is possible to build the Docker image as follows:

\$ docker build -t nl2cnl_translator_image .

2.2.3 User Manual

After building the Docker image of the prototype, it can be run as follows:

\$ docker run -p 8000:8000 -it --name nl2cnl_translator nl2cnl translator image

The container can be started and stopped as follows:

\$ docker start nl2cnl_translator \$ docker stop nl2cnl translator

It is possible to test the API through the command line with the CURL command, or through a browser with the interactive APIs. For example, by typing in the command line:

```
$ curl -X 'POST' 'http://127.0.0.1:8000/
create_reo_for_requirement/{username}?tom_code={requirement_name}
```

with nl2cnl_test as username and OPS-05.3 as requirement_name, a new REO object will be created for the user in the CNL Store and the id of the created object will be returned.

Alternatively, it is possible to open a browser and visit the following page: http://127.0.0.1:8000/docs#

The interactive APIs will be opened, and it will be possible to test them directly in the browser.

Alternatively, it is possible to test the interactive APIs by using the component installed in the MEDINA framework, which can be reached following this link:

https://nl2cnl-translator-test.k8s.medina.esilab.org/docs#/

2.2.4 Licensing information

The *NL2CNL Translator* component is open source, under the Apache License 2.0.

2.2.5 Download

The code is currently available on MEDINA's git repository, in the GitLab hosted by TECNALIA:

https://git.code.tecnalia.com/medina/public/nl2cnl-translator

2.3 Advancements within MEDINA

This section reports on the progress implemented in the *NL2CNL Translator* component from November 2022 to April 2023 (formal end of WP2). In particular:

- The Translation component has been updated to take into account the changes of the REO structure.
- The Authorization&Filtering concept has been implemented in the *NL2CNL Translator*. Currently the Cloud Service ID is passed to the component as a parameter, and the *NL2CNL Translator* takes care of inserting this information in the REO structure, thus allowing that the *CNL Editor* can implement the Authorization&Filtering function.
- The *NL2CNL Translator* has been extensively tested with different users/Cloud Services/requirements to find as many bugs as possible and correct them.

2.4 Limitations and Future Work

The main limitation in the current development of the *NL2CNL Translator* prototype regards the results obtained by the associations provided by the Metric Recommender. We are aware that the obtained results may sometimes be inaccurate. This is due to a partial lack of data to work with. In fact, the focus of the MEDINA project is on those requirements which are of assurance level high related to continuous monitoring, a small number of EUCS requirements.

In any case, the NL2CNL Translator is currently updated to deal with the August 2022 draft candidate version of the EUCS scheme [10].



3 CNL Editor

The *CNL Editor* is a tool that has two main functionalities for an authorized account: showing the REO (Requirement&Obligation) objects that are created by *NL2CNL Translator* and allowing some changes to these objects before passing to the next step of DSL Mapping. The tool has a Web interface and a REST API to carry out its functionalities.

This section describes implementation and use of *CNL Editor* tool in the context of the MEDINA framework.

3.1 Implementation

3.1.1 Functional description

The *CNL Editor* is a component of the MEDINA framework that allows a user, with a web interface, to refine the obligations (policies) associated with a specific requirement by the *NL2CNL Translator* (see section 2.1.1). The associations are contained into an object called REO (Requirement&Obligation) which is an XML file whose structure is explained in section 3.1.2.2. The obligations are showed as CNL statements and the *CNL Editor* gives the user the possibility to change the operator and/or the target value of a specific obligation or to delete obligations not valid or appropriate.

The *CNL Editor* uses a vocabulary that contains terms coming from the *Catalogue of Controls and Metrics* to guide the user with operator and target value selection. The *CNL Editor* works on REO objects stored in an internal database accessible from the *CNL Editor* itself with an internal API. Some basic operations on REOs can be invoked from other components using the CNL Editor API.

A user can connect to the *CNL Editor*, from the MEDINA UI and through the Editor Web Interface in order to:

- Visualize the list of associated REOs.
- Select a specific REO to:
 - o show the REO
 - update the REO by deleting obligations or by modifying the operator and/or the target Value
 - o delete the REO

When a REO is considered completed, the user can invoke the *map* function in the *CNL Editor*. This function calls the *DSL Mapper* component to translate CNL obligations into Rego code (see section 4.1).

Main innovation: an added value in adopting the *CNL Editor* is the possibility to change part of the obligations associated with a requirement. Specifically, the user can change the operator and the target values for an obligation, or she/he can delete obligations within a REO. The fact that it is possible to change some parameters related to the requirement, before the latter is actually referenced for assessment, gives an opportunity to the user responsible for the cloud service, i.e., to be able to change default values for the target value, or to decide not to proceed with the assessment of all the requirements in the *Catalogue of controls and metrics*.

3.1.1.1 Fitting into overall MEDINA Architecture

Figure 3 highlights the CNL Editor within the MEDINA architecture and shows its relations with the other components.

The *CNL Editor* takes as input the files stored by the *NL2CNL Translator* within the CNL Store and updates these files, that in turn will be used as input by the *DSL Mapper*. The two components mentioned, i.e., the *NL2CNL Translator* and the *DSL Mapper*, interact directly with the *CNL Editor* through its API. The *CNL Editor* uses its own vocabulary that is built on MEDINA ontology and is described in *APPENDIX D: MEDINA Vocabularies and Ontologies*.






Figure 3. Position of the CNL Editor within the MEDINA architecture (source: D5.2 [7])

Contract No. GA 952633



3.1.1.2 Component card

Component Name	CNL Editor			
Main functionalities	 The component provides the following functionalities: CNL Editor allows to work on CNL document named REO (Requirement&Obligation), i.e., a requirement description (metadata) plus a list of metrics in the form of a list of Obligations. CNL Editor allows to update obligations parameters (operator, target value) based on the Editor ontology. CNL allows to delete metrics from an already filled CNL document. 			
	CNL Editor UI: Web GUI Interface for users, with authentication			
Sub-	OWL vocabulary: Sto			
components				ernal clients/components
Description	Back Store Interface: Allows internal access to the CNL Store			
	CNL Store: Documer	it-oriente	ed storage	
	Interface name	Descript	ion	Interface technology
Main logical Interfaces	CNL Editor UI CNL Editor Web GUI		HTTP (browser)	
interfaces	Editor API	API to ac	ccess CNL documents	REST API
Requirements Mapping	List of requirements covered by this component (see D5.2 [7]): CNLE.01, CNLE.03, CNLE.04, CNLE.05, CNLE.06			
	Interfacing Compos	aant	Interface Description	
	Interfacing Compor	ient	Interface Description	ocuments in XML format
			as prepared by CNL Translator	
Interaction with other	DSL Mapper		CNL Editor provides to DSL Mapper the finalised CNL documents to be mapped	
components	Catalogue of contr metrics	ols and		oulary whose entities are logue and serves to bind
Relevant				
sequence				
diagram/s				

	Reditor_User CNL_Editor CNL_Translator DSL_Mapper Editor_api CNL_Store submit CNL Document store CNL Document get ret ret CNL_Document get ret ret comment CNL Document get ret comment comment Updated CNL Document updated CNL Document retrieve CNL Document comment CNL_Editor_User CNL_Editor CNL_Translator DSL_Mapper Editor_api CNL Store
Current TRL ¹⁰ ()	
Target TRL ¹¹ ()	TRL5
Programming language	Java, Springboot, GWT, Vaadin
License	Apache Licence 2.0
WP and task	WP2, Task 2.4
MEDINA Workflow	WF3 – EUCS deployment on ToC (see D5.4 [9])

3.1.1.3 Requirements

A collection of functional requirements (from deliverable D5.2 [7]) related to the component is presented below, along with a description of how and to what extent these requirements are implemented at the time of writing.

Requirement id	CNLE.01	
Short title	CNL Editor GUI	
Description	The controlled natural language Editor will have an interface accessible by	
	web browser.	
Implementation	Fully implemented	
state		

The *CNL Editor* is available through a Web GUI, access to which is managed by Keycloak¹². The web GUI shows the REOs associated to the Cloud Services to which the users are authorized and allows them to perform the operations *show*, *edit*, *delete*, *map* on them.

Requirement id	CNLE.02
Short title	CNL Editor policies authoring
Description	The CNL Editor will allow creating statements for security controls.

¹⁰ TRL value before validation

¹¹ TRL value after validation

¹² <u>https://www.keycloak.org</u>

Implementation	Discarded
state	

During the lifetime of the project, it was decided to stick to the requirements in the *Catalogue* of controls and metrics. Thus, CNLE.02, stating the capability to edit new requirements via the *CNL* editor, has been discarded. Users can visualize obligations, change the *targetValue/operator*, and select obligations that must remain associated with the REO for the next mapping phase, but they cannot create new obligations.

Requirement id	CNLE.03
Short title	CNL Editor input format
Description	The CNL Editor will accept as input NL2CNL Translator format (XML based).
Implementation	Fully implemented
state	

The *CNL Editor* takes as input a CNL file containing a REO object in XML format, as generated by the *NL2CNL Translator* and stored in an internal CNL Editor database. When the CNL Editor shows the list of REOs to the user, it reads them from this database. Updates can be made to these files through the internal API of the *CNL Editor*.

Requirement id	CNLE.04
Short title	CNL Editor policies changing
Description	The CNL Editor will allow changing input (policies) from NL2CNL Translator.
Implementation	Fully implemented
state	

When a user visualizes, through the *CNL Editor* GUI, the policies inside the REO, she/he can change some values for the operator and the target values, or she/he can delete policies. The REO is generated by the *NL2CNL Translator*, and the user can, in this way, refine the policies, according to the CSP specific requirements. After the edit phase, the *CNL Editor* writes the updated REO file on the internal store.

Changes can also be made in the CNL Editor by using the Editor API (see section 3.1.2.2).

Requirement id	CNLE.05
Short title	CNL Editor vocabulary
Description	The CNL Editor will use an ontology-based vocabulary to model security controls. Ontology will be the same used by NL2CNL Translator and based on W3C Web Ontology Language (OWL) standard format.
Implementation state	Fully implemented

The CNL Editor is strictly related to a vocabulary, which is an internal file containing the ontology that the CNL Editor uses for CNL purposes. The Ontology comes from The Catalogue of controls and metrics, and contains terms related to MetricName, Operator, TargetValue, and ResourceTypes, which are the terms used inside the policy statements. This vocabulary must always be aligned with the Catalogue of controls and metrics.

Requirement id	CNLE.06	
Short title	CNL Editor output format	
Description	The CNL Editor will generate security controls with an XML format suitable	
	for the DSL Mapper.	
Implementation	Fully implemented	
state		

The *CNL Editor* writes the updated REOs in XML format and this is the input for the *DSL Mapper*. The mapping function, which converts CNL policies into Rego code, is invoked by the *CNL Editor* through the *Map* button on the GUI.

3.1.2 Technical description

In the following, we present the architecture of the *CNL Editor* and the description of its subcomponents, together with the list of APIs available for the other tools.

3.1.2.1 Component architecture

The CNL Editor architecture is depicted in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Overview of the CNL Editor architecture

The component is written in Java with the use of Spring Boot¹³, GWT (Google Web Toolkit¹⁴) and Vaadin¹⁵ frameworks. Spring Boot is used for all the API and the *CNL Editor* Web Application logic, while GWT and Vaadin are used for the UI. The Web GUI is used for the complete functionalities of the *CNL Editor*. CRUD (Create, Read, Update, Delete) operations on REO are available through REST APIs.

The component is organized in the following modules which are detailed in section 3.1.2.2:

- CNL Editor
- CNL Editor API
- CNL Store
- CNL Store API
- Vocabulary
- User Store

The CNL Editor has interfaces with:

• The user, that can use the Web GUI

¹³ <u>https://spring.io/projects/spring-boot</u>

¹⁴ <u>https://www.gwtproject.org/</u>

¹⁵ <u>https://vaadin.com/</u>

- The *NL2CNL Translator*, that builds the input for the CNL Editor (user's REOs file)
- The DSL Mapper, that takes as input the REOs located in the CNL Store to map them into Rego code

In addition, the CNL Editor exposes the endpoints (REST API) listed in section 3.1.2.2, which can be invoked without the use of the Editor GUI.

3.1.2.2 Description of components

This section presents the components available in the *CNL Editor* and describes how they have been developed to meet the MEDINA requirements.

CNL Editor

The CNL Editor (frontend and core application) manages the user interaction and allows operations on REOs and the *DSL Mapper* requests. It has a web interface where a user can show a REO and select operations on it.

The REO structure is composed of two parts:

- Metadata, containing the identification of the REO and the data of the specific requirement:
 - o REO name, status, creation date and relevant Cloud Service
 - o Vocabulary version
 - TOM Code, TOM Name, Security Control, Framework and Assurance Level
- Policies, containing the list of all the obligations associated to the selected requirement.

These two parts also reflect the two sections that the user can see on the web page when showing a REO: Metadata on the upper part, and Policies (Obligations) at the bottom (see Figure 5).

One of the enhancements that have been made in the *CNL Editor* component is to visualize, in the metadata section, the Cloud Service Id to which the REO is associated.

MEDINA		Requirements & Obligations	hpe-use
.bout		NL Editor	
atalogue of ontrols and 1etrics	Back		
rchestrator	Title	REO from AM-04.1B Metadata	
	Status	AVALADLE	
equirements &	Date	2022-04-27 17:42:00	
bligations	Cloud Service ID	00000002-b2ad-4db5-9d33-cd10b7d5d840	
ontinuous	Additional Information	on	
ertificate	UUID	DSA-24bb979a-5f95-4e75-bc66-1aeeff776c37.xml	?
valuation	Vocabulary URI	https://cnl-vocabulary-dev.k8s.medina.esilab.org/vocabularies/medina_vocabulary_dev_v2.0.ow#	?
isk Assessment	ТОМ		
rganisational	TOM Code	AM-04.1B	?
vidence	TOM Name	AM-04.1B	?
ssessment	Security Control	AM-04	?
elf-Sovereign Jentity	Framework	EUCS	?
	Туре	ORGANIZATIONAL	?
	Description	The CSP shall ensure and document that all employees are committed to the policies and procedures for acceptable use and safe handling of assets in the situations described in AM-02	2. ?
	Assurance level	BASIC	2
: has received funding from	Obligations	Obligations	
ean Union's Horizon 2020	Policies	Metric ID / Source	
nd innovation programme nt agreement No 952633.		vareProtectionOutput Boolean(==,true) MalwareProtectionOutput / recomme	ender ?

Figure 5. Screenshot of a REO object as it appears in the CNL Editor GUI



CNL Editor API

The CNL Editor exposes REST APIs for CRUD operations on REOs. They are listed in Table 4.

Function name	Parameters	Return Type	Description
/reo/create/{userna me}	username	HTTP Response	Store a new REO in the CNL Store and return a unique REO identifier. This function is designed to be called by <i>the NL2CNL Translator</i> which must transmit as a parameter the identifier of the user that owns the REO.
			This is a POST function, since it generates a file .xml containing the REO data. If successful, the status code returned will be of type 200, otherwise an error code will be returned depending on the problem occurred.
/reo/delete/{reoid}	reoid	HTTP Response	Delete from the CNL Store the REO specified by the REO identifier. If successful, the status code returned will be of type 200, otherwise an error code will be returned depending on the problem occurred.
/reo/filterby/clouds ervice	List of Cloud Service Ids	HTTP Response	Provide a list of REOs, associated to the Cloud Service Ids in input, with details. If successful, the status code returned will be of type 200, otherwise an error code will be returned depending on the problem occurred.
/reo/get/{reoid}	reoid	HTTP Response	Retrieve the REO XML file by its identifier. If successful, the status code returned will be of type 200, otherwise an error code will be returned depending on the problem occurred.
/reo/update/{reoid}	reoid	HTTP Response	Rewrite the XML file of the REO specified by the identifier. It is used by the <i>CNL Editor</i> to update a REO when the user changes the operator and/or the target value. If successful, the status code returned will be of type 200, otherwise an error code will be returned depending on the problem occurred.

Table 4. List of available endpoints for the CNL E	Editor component
--	------------------

CNL Store and API

The CNL Store is the database containing all the REO files. There is an internal API (usable only by the *CNL Editor* internal code) to access the CNL Store that directly acts on the database.

Vocabulary

The Vocabulary stores the ontology that the *CNL Editor* uses to constrain the user in selecting policy parameters like the operator and the target values.

User Store

The User Store is the internal database that contains usernames and REO associations for each username. Users are created in alignment with Keycloak¹⁶.

3.1.2.3 Technical specifications

The *CNL Editor* component is written in Java with the use of Spring Boot, GWT and Vaadin frameworks. Both the API and the Web GUI are served through Tomcat application server.

The vocabulary ontology-based store is a file in RDF/XML format, with .owl extension, that supports OWL Web Ontology Language and is W3C Standard Compliant. Details about the Editor ontology are in *APPENDIX D: MEDINA Vocabularies and Ontologies*.

The User Store is a MySQL database (mariadb software) that manages Editor users and the association between users and REOs.

The CNL Store (mongodb software) is a document oriented (no relational) database that contains all the REO files.

3.2 Delivery and Usage

3.2.1 Package information

The *CNL Editor* code is stored in a private GitLab group named "CNL Editor Tools" (see section 3.2.5). Inside this folder there are five different projects related the tool: the "CNL Store API", which implements the functionalities of the CNL Store and the mongodb database for the data persistence; the "CNL Editor API", which implements the CNL Editor API module; the "CNL Editor" and the "CNL Editor Frontend", which implement the CNL Editor core application and its web interface; and the "CNL Vocabulary" for the storage of the ontology (see Figure 6).

C CNL Editor Tools ⊕ Group ID: 2388 t	☐ ✓ New su	bgroup New project
Subgroups and projects Shared projects Archived projects	Search by r	Oldest updated 🗸
CNL Store API CLL Store API Source	★ 0	5 months ago
CNL Editor API	★ 0	4 months ago
C CNL Editor	★ 0	4 months ago
C CNL Vocabulary A The CNL vocabularies	★ 0	4 months ago
CNL Editor Frontend	* 0	2 months ago

Figure 6. CNL Editor folders' structure

3.2.2 Installation instructions

The *CNL Editor* is developed using the microservice architecture and is composed of 5 microservices containerized in Docker. To run the components in a local machine, you can access

¹⁶ <u>https://www.keycloak.org</u>

with your credentials to the GitLab repository and pull the code, then from the root folder it is possible to build the Docker image of each microservice as follows:

```
    CNL Store API:

        $ docker build -t cnl-store-api ./CNL Store API

    CNL Editor API
        $ docker build -t cnl-editor-api ./CNL Editor API

    CNL Editor
        $ docker build -t cnl-editor ./CNL Editor

    CNL Vocabulary
        $ docker build -t cnl-vocabulary ./CNL Vocabulary

    CNL Editor Frontend
        $ docker build -t cnl-editor-frontend ./CNL Editor Frontend
```

After that, it is possible to run the entire application using Kubernetes. Indeed, each component has the manifest files declared in a dedicated "Kubernetes" folder, as depicted in Figure 7.

master v cnl-store-api / kubernete	Is / + - History Find file Web ID	DE 🕹 🗸 Clone 🗸
Updated to use tls (https) Manea, Mirko authored 7 months ago		07608b06
Name	Last commit	Last update
{} cnl-store-api-cm.yaml	Added k8s yaml files	8 months ago
	Update cnl-store-api-deployment.yaml with "TIME" env varia	8 months ago
{} cnl-store-api-ingress.yaml	Updated to use tls (https)	7 months ago
{} cnl-store-api-secret.yaml	Added k8s yaml files	8 months ago
{} cnl-store-api-svc.yaml	Added k8s yaml files	8 months ago
	Update k8s secret	8 months ago
	Update k8s secret	8 months ago
	Update k8s secret	8 months ago
	Update k8s secret	8 months ago
	Update k8s secret	8 months ago

Figure 7. Example of CNL Store API Kubernetes manifests

To start the entire tool, execute the following commands:

\$ kubectl apply -k ./CNL Store API/kubernetes \$ kubectl apply -k ./CNL Editor API/kubernetes \$ kubectl apply -k ./CNL Editor/kubernetes \$ kubectl apply -k ./CNL Vocabulary/kubernetes \$ kubectl apply -k ./CNL Editor Frontend/kubernetes

3.2.3 User Manual

This section shows the use of the CNL Editor and its functionalities.

The user can access the *CNL Editor* through the MEDINA Integrated UI (see Figure 8): <u>https://integrated-ui-test.k8s.medina.esilab.org/</u> [internal use only - authentication required], by selecting on the left menu "Requirements and Obligations".

The *CNL Editor* presents all REO objects created and associated with Cloud Service Ids for which the user is authorised (as defined in her/his profile in Keycloak).

				Requiren	nents & Obliga	tions	hpe-user2 ¿
About	E CNL Editor	Filter by Name, ID, or St	atus]			
Catalogue of	USERNAME: HPE-USER2	Name	Creator	Status	Creation Date	ID	Cloud Service ID
 Controls and Metrics 	C List	REO from PS-02.4B	hpe-user1	Customised	2023-04-26	DSA-20423af1-87c4-4262-8d65-6b0f1f34ef20	0000001-b2ad-4db5-9d33-cd10b7d5d840
•	Status	REO from AM-04.1B	hpe-user2	 Available 	2023-04-26	DSA-24bb979a-5f95-4e75-bc66-1aeeff776c37	00000002-b2ad-4db5-9d33-cd10b7d5d840
Orchestrator	About	REO from PM-03.1S	hpe-user2	Customised	2023-04-26	DSA-9011787a-eec0-4e30-b7ab-f2ebbf83d62b	00000002-b2ad-4db5-9d33-cd10b7d5d840
Continuous C							
is project has received funding fro the European Union's Horizon 2020 search and innovation programme inder grant agreement No 952633.							

Figure 8. List of REOs available for the user hpe-user2 in the CNL Editor

REO selection

The user can select a REO from the list and choose an operation on it: *Show, Edit , Copy, Raw* or *Delete* (see Figure 9), and *Map* if the REO is completed (see Figure 10).

		hpe-user2 දු						
About	E CNL Editor	Filter by Name, ID, or St	atus					Selected Id DSA-20423af1-87c4-4262-8d65-6
Catalogue of	USERNAME: HPE-USER2	Name	Creator	Status	Creation Date	ID	Cloud Se	
 Controls and Metrics 	🕼 List	REO from PS-02.4B	hpe-user1	Customised	2023-04-26	DSA-20423af1-87c4-4262-8d65-6b0f1f34ef20	000000	Cloud service id
0	Status About	REO from AM-04.1B	hpe-user2	 Available 	2023-04-26	DSA-24bb979a-5f95-4e75-bc66-1aeeff776c37	000000	0000001-b2ad-4db5-9d33- cd10b7d5d840
Orchestrator	19 ADOUT	REO from PM-03.15	hpe-user2	Customised	2023-04-26	DSA-9011787a-eec0-4e30-b7ab-f2ebbf83d62b	000000	
 Requirements & Obligations Continuous Certificate Evaluation 								
Risk Assessment								
Organisational Evidence Assessment								
Self-Sovereign Identity								Show
								Edit
$\langle \bigcirc \rangle$								Сору
project has received funding from European Union's Horizon 2020	3							Raw
earch and innovation programme der grant agreement No 952633.								Delete

Figure 9. List of available operations for a selected REO (Customised State) in the CNL Editor

MEDINA		hpe-user2 온						
About	E CNL Editor	Filter by Name, ID, or St	atus]				Selected ld DSA-20423af1-87c4-4262-8d65-6t
Catalogue of	USERNAME: HPE-USER2	Name	Creator	Status	Creation Date	ID	Cloud Se	
 Controls and Metrics 	🕼 List	REO from PS-02.4B	hpe-user1	Completed	2023-04-26	DSA-20423af1-87c4-4262-8d65-6b0f1f34ef20	000000	Cloud service id 0000001-b2ad-4db5-9d33-
	Status About	REO from AM-04.1B	hpe-user2	Available	2023-04-26	DSA-24bb979a-5f95-4e75-bc66-1aeeff776c37	000000	
Orchestrator	e About	REO from PM-03.1S	hpe-user2	Customised	2023-04-26	DSA-9011787a-eec0-4e30-b7ab-f2ebbf83d62b	000000	
Obligations Continuous Certificate Evaluation Risk Assessment Forganisational Evidence Assessment Self-Sovereign Identify								
Identity								Show
								Мар
								Сору
is project has received funding from he European Union's Horizon 2020								Raw
esearch and innovation programme under grant agreement No 952633.								Delete

Figure 10. List of available operations for a selected REO (Completed state) in the CNL Editor

A REO can have different states during its lifetime. The "Customised" state means that the REO can be changed (by selecting "Update" when in Edit mode). By selecting "Complete" during Editing (see Figure 11), the REO is saved and passed to the "Completed" state. It is now ready to be mapped.

Show a specific REO

When a user selects "Show", a page is displayed with the REO data. This feature allows the user to visualize the Requirement specification for that REO, the list of Obligations (Policies section) with details and their source (*Catalogue of Controls and Metrics* or *NL2CNL Translator*). Figure 5 shows an example of REO in the CNL Editor GUI.

Edit a specific REO

When a user selects "Edit", the page shown in Figure 11 is displayed, showing the Requirement and Obligation list, where the user can make changes. With this functionality the REO can be adapted to a specific Cloud Service Provider, by setting a Target Value different from the default value (as defined in *Catalogue of controls and metrics*) and by deleting obligations that are not necessary for one specific scenario.

	CNL Editor	
Update Complete	Back	
Title	REO from OPS-18.6 test with source	1
Status	CUSTOMISED	
Date	2022-05-19 17:42:00	
Description	This REO has been created for requirement OPS-18.6	1
Additional Informat	lion	
UUID	DSA-475c8ee4-d828-4332-95dd-1b66125a4393.xml	?
Vocabulary URI	https://cnl-vocabulary-test.k8s.medina.esilab.org/vocabularies/medina_vocabulary_test_v1.0.ow#	?
том		
TOM Code	OPS-18.6	?
TOM Name	OPS-18.6	?
Security Control	OPS-18	?
Framework	EUCS	?
Туре	ORGANIZATIONAL	?
Description	The CSP shall equip with automatic update mechanisms the assets provided by the CSP that the CSCs have to install or operate under their own responsibility, to ease the rollout of patches and updates after an initial approval from the CSC	?
Assurance level	HIGH	?
Obligations	Obligation	
Compute.VirtualMachine N	AUST AutomaticUpdatesEnabled Boolean AutomaticUpdatesEnabled Complete the policy Change Change Change CargetValue	
Compute.VirtualMachine N	AutomaticUpdatesinterval ? AutomaticUpdatesinterval ? Complete the policy Add additional info for Integer#1 Add Info	
AMOE.PolicyDocument M	UST UpdatePolicyCheckQ1 na ? UpdatePolicyCheckQ1 © #8 Complete the policy Add additional info for na#1 Add Info	

Figure 11. Editing a REO object in the CNL Editor

Map a specific REO

This option allows to map a REO, i.e., the *CNL Editor* calls the *DSL Mapper* that will generate the correspondent Rego code for this REO (see section 4).

CNL Editor APIs

The *CNL Editor* APIs (see Figure 12) are accessible through the following link: <u>https://cnl-editor-api-test.k8s.medina.esilab.org/swagger-ui.html#/reo-operations-controller</u>

reo-operations-controller REO Operations Controller	\sim
POST /reo/create/{username} Creates new REO	
GET /reo/delete/{reoid} Delete REO	
GET /reo/filterby/cloudservice Fetch the details of the REO filter by cloud service ID	
GET /reoid} Retrive the REO file	
GET /reo/map/{reoid} Send REO to Mapper	
POST /reo/update/{reoid} Update the REO file	



3.2.4 Licensing information

The CNL Editor is close source/proprietary code (Copyright by HPE).

3.2.5 Download

The *CNL Editor* is stored in a private GitLab repository and not in a public repository since it is not Open Source.

The URL of the private GitLab repository URL is as follows:

https://git.code.tecnalia.com/medina/wp2/task_2.4/cnl-editor-tools [internal use only - authentication required]

3.3 Advancements within MEDINA

From November 2022 to April 2023, we worked on improving the tool. We implemented the filtering of the REOs based on Cloud Service IDs (CS_Id) associated with the users in their Keycloak profile. While the initial prototype only showed the REOs that users created in the previous *NL2CNL Translator* step, now, REOs are created with the relevant Cloud Service IDs stored in the .xml file and accounts can view and operate on all REOs that are associated to the Cloud Services on which the user is authorized to view and operate on, i.e., those CS_Ids defined in the account profile in Keycloak. So, just to make an example:

- hpe-user1 is authorized to access Cloud Service Id 0000001-b2ad-4db5-9d33cd10b7d5d840
- hpe-user2 is authorized to access Cloud Service Ids 0000001-b2ad-4db5-9d33cd10b7d5d840 and 00000002-b2ad-4db5-9d33-cd10b7d5d840
- REO Id DSA-20423af1-87c4-4262-8d65-6b0f1f34ef20 is associated to CS-Id 0000001-b2ad-4db5-9d33-cd10b7d5d840
- REO Ids DSA-24bb979a-5f95-4e75-bc66-1aeeff776c37 and DSA-9011787a-eec0-4e30b7ab-f2ebbf83d62b are associated to CS_Id 00000002-b2ad-4db5-9d33-cd10b7d5d840

As a result:

- *hpe-user1* can view and operate only on REO Id DSA-20423af1-87c4-4262-8d65-6b0f1f34ef20 (see Figure 13)
- *hpe-user2* can display and operate on all three REOs of the example (see Figure 14).




Figure 13. Filtering example: hpe-user1 REOs list



				Requiren	nents & Obliga	tions	hpe-user2
About	E CNL Editor	Filter by Name, ID, or St	atus				
Catalogue of	USERNAME: HPE-USER2	Name	Creator	Status	Creation Date	ID	Cloud Service ID
 Controls and Metrics 	C List	REO from PS-02.4B	hpe-user1	Completed	2023-04-26	DSA-20423af1-87c4-4262-8d65-6b0f1f34ef20	0000001-b2ad-4db5-9d33-cd10b7d5d840
Orchestrator	 Status About 	REO from AM-04.1B	hpe-user2	 Available 	2023-04-26	DSA-24bb979a-5f95-4e75-bc66-1aeeff776c37	00000002-b2ad-4db5-9d33-cd10b7d5d840
Gichestrator	• About	REO from PM-03.15	hpe-user2	 Customised 	2023-04-26	DSA-9011787a-eec0-4e30-b7ab-f2ebbf83d62b	00000002-b2ad-4db5-9d33-cd10b7d5d840
Requirements & Obligations							
Continuous							
Certificate Evaluation							
Risk Assessment							
Organisational Evidence Assessment							
Self-Sovereign Identity							
$\langle \bigcirc \rangle$							
project has received funding from							
European Union's Horizon 2020 sarch and innovation programme							

Figure 14. Filtering example: hpe-user2 REOs list

Furthermore, we have updated the vocabulary according to the last release of the *Catalogue of controls and metrics*, and we have removed the possibility, for an account, to create new REOs and to add new Obligations to a REO, as requested by the MEDINA updated workflows (see D5.4 [9]).

Validation findings and possible improvements

At the time of finalizing this deliverable, we received some feedback regarding the *CNL Editor* from the first phase of the validation, that was conducted by WP6 in month M28. Below we describe this feedback and propose how to address the issues that have arisen so far.

The Validation work package, WP6, reported two issues regarding the CNL Editor:

- 1. General feedback: "Authorization and Filtering concept is not yet implemented by the Component", nor the Unified UI
- 2. Workflow 3¹⁷: Error message while accessing *CNL Editor* with test UC1 users ("White label error page")

For Authorization and Filtering, we finalized the implementation of filtering for Cloud Service ID, as explained above. The user can now see and manage all REOs associated to Cloud Service IDs for which the user is granted in Keycloak. For this purpose, we have created a new API (/reo/filterby/cloudservice).

Regarding the error message occurred during the Use Case 1 validation tests for Workflow 3 (Bosch Use Case), this was related to an incomplete configuration of Bosch Use Case users in Keycloak. An error appeared when user tried to connect to the CNL Editor from the MEDINA Integrated UI. We solved it by reviewing the users' configuration and now Bosch users can connect to the *CNL Editor*.

3.4 Limitations and Future Work

There is no evidence of limitations in the implementation of the *CNL editor*, compared to what was agreed upon by the consortium. No major future work is planned.

¹⁷ The interested reader may refer to D5.4 [8] for Use Cases and Workflows

4 DSL Mapper

The *DSL Mapper* is a component of the MEDINA framework that has the aim of mapping the obligations expressed in CNL into executable policies expressed in DSL. In particular, the obligations resulting from the previous steps are embedded in an XML object, called REO, while the output generated by the *DSL Mapper* is expected to be compliant with the DSL chosen in MEDINA, i.e., the Rego language¹⁸.

The Rego language allows the creation of policies that can be used to automatically assess evidence, collected by the other tools (the *MEDINA Evidence Management Tools* are described in detail in deliverable D3.6 [6]).

When evaluating Rego policies, three elements are considered:

- An *input*, i.e., the request
- A *policy*, also called rule
- (Optional) external data

The *input* is checked against the *policy* to evaluate if it complies, possibly considering *external data*.

In MEDINA, Rego policies are used according to the following: the evidence collectors create evidence that need to be assessed using the MEDINA metrics. For example, evidence that describes an object storage may need to be assessed using a metric which defines that this storage needs to have a backup. This is a typical policy evaluation task: a request (the evidence describing the storage) is provided and needs to be checked for compliance with a pre-defined policy (the metric), sometimes using also external data (the target value and the operator of the metric). The role of the *DSL Mapper* is to generate the description of the policies and the description of the external data, while the inputs are provided by the evidence collectors.

4.1 Implementation

4.1.1 Functional description

The DSL Mapper interacts with the *CNL Editor*, from which it receives the trigger to start the mapping. It also needs to access the CNL Store through the CNL Editor APIs to retrieve the REO objects containing the information to be mapped, which has been created by the *NL2CNL Translator* according to the MEDINA Ontology. Finally, it interacts with the *Orchestrator* to send the results of the mapping, i.e., the Rego rules generated for each obligation.

Main innovation: The main innovation of the DSL Mapper consists in providing a translation from a non-executable language (CNL) to an executable one (DSL). In fact, the output policies of the DSL Mapper, expressed in Rego code, are used as input for the *MEDINA Evidence Management Tools*, which can automatically evaluate these policies to verify the compliance of a CSP to a certification schema.

4.1.1.1 Fitting into overall MEDINA Architecture

Figure 15 highlights the *DSL Mapper* within the MEDINA architecture.

¹⁸ <u>https://www.openpolicyagent.org/</u>




Figure 15. Position of the DSL Mapper within the MEDINA architecture (source D5.2 [7])



4.1.1.2 Component card

-									
Component Name	DSL Mapper								
Main functionalities	 The component provides the following functionalities: Mapping of the CNL obligations + metadata output to a DSL (e.g., Rego) 								
Sub- components Description	API Server: Implements the API interface towards other MEDINA components and connects and coordinates with the other components.Mapping: Generates the Rego rules for the obligations associated to a certain requirement.								
Main logical Interfaces	Interface nameDescriptionInterface technologyAPI ServerAPI to access DSL Mapper functionalitiesREST API								
Requirements Mapping	List of requirements covered by this component (see D5.2 [7]): DSLM.01, DSLM.03								
Interaction with other components	Interfacing ComponentInterface DescriptionCNL EditorThe DSL Mapper is called from the CNL Editor, which passes, as a parameter, an object in XML format, including all the necessary requirement metadata, metrics information, CNL obligationsOrchestratorThe DSL Mapper maps the selected obligations + metadata into a DSL (Rego) and pushes the output to the Orchestrator by exploiting its API								
Relevant sequence diagram/s	Compliance Manager using unified UI revise REO, send to mapping store rego rules								
Current TRL ¹⁹	TRL4								
Target TRL ²⁰	TRL5								
Programming language	Python 3.8								
License	Apache Licence 2.0								
WP and task	WP2, Task 2.5								
MEDINA Workflow	WF3 – EUCS deployment on ToC (see D5.4 [9])								

¹⁹ TRL value before validation

²⁰ TRL value after validation

4.1.1.3 Requirements

A collection of functional requirements (from deliverable D5.2 [7]) related to the component is presented below, along with a description of how and to what extent these requirements are implemented at the time of writing.

Requirement id	DSLM.01
Short title	Translation to selected DSLs
Description	The controlled natural language output of NL2CNL translator and further edited - when needed - with the CNL editor, will be semi-automatically mapped (meaning, with little human intervention) to the enforceable languages (aka, Domain Specific Languages, DSLs) inputs to tools such as Clouditor, or whatever will be the chosen DSL in MEDINA.
Implementation	Fully implemented
state	

The *DSL Mapper* aims to automatically map a set of obligations into executable policies, expressed in a DSL. These policies are then used by the *Orchestrator* to evaluate a certain requirement. The DSL chosen for representing policies in MEDINA is the Rego language. The current implementation of the *DSL Mapper* component is able to map the obligations into Rego rules.

Requirement id	DSLM.02
Short title	Mapping elements
Description	The mapping process will take into account relevant elements of the target certification framework, including (some) technical and organizational measures, quantitative/qualitative security metrics, complex compliance conditions, and cloud supply chain elements. The mapping process will prioritize the translation of those requirements in CNL that can automatically be enforced by WP4 and that are considered highly relevant by the EU authorities at stage.
Implementation	Discarded
state	

This requirement is an aggregate of requirements that have already been considered in other components. Specifically, it is represented by requirements ECO.02 - Conformity to selected assurance level, CCCE.01 - Continuous Evaluation of Assessment Results, UC00.06 - Security Controls Translator, UC00.07 - Define Measurement Targets, and UC00.17 - MEDINA complies to EUCS. Therefore, this requirement is no longer requested.

Requirement id	DSLM.03
Short title	DSL output compliancy
Description	The tool will output REGO rules, compliant with the input required by the
	Orchestrator.
Implementation	Fully implemented
state	

As already introduced, the output expected by the *DSL Mapper* must be compliant with the Rego language and with the input required by the *Orchestrator*. Currently, the *Orchestrator* needs two files to describe a Rego rule, namely the *metric.rego* (containing the policy) and the *data.json* (containing the external data). The current implementation of the *DSL Mapper* is able to generate both the *data.json* file and the metric.rego files.

4.1.2 Technical description

This section describes the technical details of the implemented *DSL Mapper* component. First, the architectural design is presented, consisting of the architectural view and the connection between the respective subcomponents. This is followed by information on the individual subcomponents and finally by a summary of the technical specifications for the implementation of the *DSL Mapper*.

4.1.2.1 Component architecture

The DSL Mapper is written in Python 3.8 and is organized into modules. Its functionalities are available through a REST API, thus similarly to the *NL2CNL Translator*, the FastAPI framework²¹ has been used for implementing it. Figure 16 shows the architecture of the DSL Mapper.




Figure 16. Overview of the DSL Mapper architecture

The available modules are organized in two subcomponents: the first one is called **API Server** and is responsible for the API interface to other MEDINA components. Moreover, it coordinates all the *DSL Mapper* operations. The second is the **Mapping** subcomponent, which implements the generation of the Rego rules.

Table 5 shows the endpoints available to interact with the DSL Mapper.



²¹ <u>https://fastapi.tiangolo.com</u>

Function name	Parameters	Return Type	Description
map_obligations _to_rego	reo_id	HTTP Response	This function is designed to be called by the CNL Editor, which must transmit as a parameter the identifier of the REO to be assessed.
			This is a POST function, since it generates a Rego rule for each obligation included in the specified REO. If successful, the status code returned will be of type 200, otherwise an error code will be returned depending on the problem occurred.
livez	None	HTTP Response	This function is used by the Kubernetes primary node agent to know when to restart a container. In fact, many applications running for long periods of time eventually transition to broken states, and cannot recover except by being restarted.
readyz	None	HTTP Response	This function is used by the Kubernetes primary node agent to know when a container is ready to start accepting traffic.

4.1.2.2 Description of components

This section presents the components available in the *DSL Mapper* and describes how they have been developed.

API Server

The API Server is the main subcomponent of the *DSL Mapper*, since it connects and coordinates with the other components. Its activity is performed in the following steps:

- 1. The server waits for requests from the *CNL Editor*. When a CNL Editor user is satisfied with the obligations associated to a REO, he/she invokes the *DSL Mapper* through the *Map* button. The identifier of the current REO object is passed as a parameter to the *DSL Mapper*.
- 2. The *DSL Mapper* loads the REO object from the CNL Store using the CNL Editor APIs, by using the REO identifier received from the *CNL Editor*.
- 3. The DSL Mapper calls the Mapping component to obtain the Rego rules corresponding to the obligations.
- 4. Finally, the Rego rules are sent to the *Orchestrator* to be further processed.

Mapping

The Mapping subcomponent aims at generating the Rego rules for the obligations associated to a certain requirement. As previously explained, for each obligation, the *Orchestrator* requires two input files, *metric.rego*, which includes a policy description, and *data.json*, which reports the operator and the target value associated to an obligation and specified by the user through the *CNL Editor* interface.

Let the reader consider, for example, the following obligation, associated to the requirement OPS-05.3: The CSP shall automatically monitor the systems covered by the malware protection and the configuration of the corresponding mechanisms to guarantee fulfilment of OPS-05.1.

Evidence	Action	Metric	Target Value Type	(Operator, Target Value)	
Compute.VirtualMachine	MUST	MalwareProtectionEnabled	Boolean	(=,true)	

This obligation expresses that the evidence describing a Virtual Machine object needs to be assessed using a metric which defines that this virtual machine needs to have a malware protection mechanism enabled.

Thus, the Mapping component is expected to generate a *data.json* file containing the following information:

```
{
package clouditor.metrics.malware_protection_enabled
import data.clouditor.compare
default applicable = false
default compliant = false
enabled := input.malwareProtection.enabled
applicable {
    enabled != null
}
compliant {
    compare(data.operator, data.target_value, enabled)
```

The *metric.rego* file, which contains the policy to be assessed, will be similar to the following:

The two files described above are generated by the Mapping subcomponent for each obligation it founds in the REO object under consideration.

4.1.2.3 Technical specifications

The *DSL Mapper* prototype is written in Python, version 3.8. A selection of the most important libraries is shown in the following and a full list including all the used libraries can be found in the GitLab repository²².

- fastapi
- uvicorn
- pandas
- python-keycloak

²² <u>https://git.code.tecnalia.com/medina/public/dsl-mapper</u>

- xmlschema
- xmltodict

4.2 Delivery and Usage

The following subsections give a short overview of the delivery and usage of the prototype.

4.2.1 Package information

The package is delivered in a repository hosted on GitLab. Even if it is not intended to be used as a standalone tool, it is possible to use it for testing purposes by accessing its APIs through a web browser. The component is available as a Docker image. Table 6 shows the main folders and files.

Folder/file	Description
api_server.py	This file contains the code needed for implementing the APIs and for managing the communication between components.
Dockerfile	This file contains the list of commands that the Docker client calls while creating an image.
config.py	This file includes all the configurations (variables, paths, etc.) used by the prototype.
app_utils/	This folder includes a set of utility functions.
clouditor_orchestrator_client_legacy/	This folder contains the client to interact with the <i>Orchestrator</i> component.
cnl_editor_client/	This folder contains the client to interact with the <i>CNL Editor</i> component.
openapis/	This folder contains the auto-generated OpenAPI files.

Table 6. The most important files and folders implementing the DSL Mapper

4.2.2 Installation instructions

The full up-to-date installation instructions can be found in the README at the DSL Mapper repository in GitLab at this link: <u>https://git.code.tecnalia.com/medina/public/dsl-mapper/-/blob/main/README.md</u>

To setup the component locally, it is possible to build the Docker image with the following command:

\$ docker build -t dsl_mapper_image .

4.2.3 User Manual

As stated before, the *DSL Mapper* is not intended to be used as a standalone tool, since it needs to strictly interact with the *CNL Editor* to function properly. In particular, the main endpoint available in the *DSL Mapper* takes as parameter the identifier of a REO object saved into the CNL Store.

The *DSL Mapper* cannot be easily configured to work as a standalone tool, since it depends on the output of the *CNL Editor*. In any case, it is possible to run the Docker image with the following command:

\$ docker run -p 8000:8000 -it -name dsl mapper dsl mapper image

The generated container can be started and stopped with the following commands:

```
$ docker start dsl_mapper
```

\$ docker stop dsl_mapper

The *DSL Mapper* provisional APIs can be tested through the command line by exploiting the CURL command, or through a browser by using the interactive APIs. Nevertheless, the user will receive an error message when trying to map a REO object, due to the missing input file that is taken from the CNL Store of the *CNL Editor*.

4.2.4 Licensing information

The DSL Mapper prototype is open source, under the Apache License 2.0.

4.2.5 Download

The code is currently available on MEDINA's git repository, on the GitLab hosted by TECNALIA:

https://git.code.tecnalia.com/medina/public/dsl-mapper

4.3 Advancements within MEDINA

This section reports the advancements implemented in the DSL Mapper component within the last period of WP2 (it formally ends at month 30). In particular, the following list includes the improvements introduced between month 24 and month 30:

- The component development has been finalized and the code has been pushed to the Kubernetes cluster both in the DEV and the TEST environments.
- The generation of the Rego rules is currently available for all obligations generated by the *NL2CNL Translator*.
- The generation of the *metric.rego* file is currently working for all available metrics/operators/target values.
- The connection with the *Orchestrator* has been finalized and tested and it works seamlessly, i.e., the information stored in the REO is correctly extracted, processed, and passed to the Orchestrator.
- The Authorization&Filtering functionalities are fulfilled, since the Cloud Service ID is stored in the REO structure and validated by the *CNL Editor* before the mapping function is activated. This guarantees that a user can visualize and then map REOs belonging to a certain Cloud Service only if this Cloud Service is associated with the user itself in her/his Keycloak profile.

The *DSL Mapper* has been updated to deal with the August 2022 draft candidate version of the EUCS scheme [10].

4.4 Limitations and Future Work

The *DSL Mapper* is a novel component, and its use is strongly linked to the development of the MEDINA project, in particular the *CNL Editor*. This limits its reusability as a stand-alone component.

A further limitation is that the output of the *DSL Mapper*, although using a generic policy specification language, has been adapted to work in synergy with the *Orchestrator*.



5 Conclusions

This document describes the main results achieved during the MEDINA project regarding the definition of the Cloud Security Certification Language, a machine-readable language in which the policies derived from the EUCS Cloud Certification Requirements are expressed and fed into the *MEDINA Evidence Management Tools*. The main achievements are as follows:

- Final implementation and testing of the *NL2CNL Translator* component, for the representation of Cloud Security requirements into the MEDINA CNL.
- Final implementation and testing of the *CNL Editor* component, a tool that allows users to visualize -and modify part of- the policies elicited for security controls.
- Final implementation and testing of the *DSL Mapper* component, a tool that can translate the generated CNL to an enforceable machine-oriented Domain Specification Language.
- Integration of the components within WP2 and with respect to the other components of the MEDINA framework. The validation phase is in progress and, if necessary, the integration between the components described in this document and with others of the MEDINA framework may be modified to meet new possible requirements of WP5 Integration and WP6 Validation.

For each tool, this document describes its purpose and scope, the final coverage of the MEDINA requirements, the component's internal architecture and its subcomponents, the relation to other components, the final implementation state, and technical details of the component, including the programming languages and used libraries, information about the packaging and installation of the component, and licensing. Moreover, the advancements within the MEDINA framework have been highlighted.

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7 APPENDIX A: The Cloud Certification Language, Architecture, Sequence Diagram and Coverage of Requirements

7.1 Motivation

Cloud certification schemes consist of a set of rules, technical requirements, standards and procedures to strengthen the cybersecurity of ICT services and products offered to citizens, and their terms and conditions are usually published in natural language. This is the case, e.g., of the EUCS draft candidate Cloud Certification Scheme [10]. Thus, a rigorous translation procedure is required to produce a machine-readable format out of textual NL requirements. This translation should minimise as much as possible human intervention - which is prone to errors and time consuming.

The Cloud Certification language is the language that the MEDINA consortium is developing in the course of the project, a language which will permit to express rules for cloud certification, in a uniform way and without the ambiguity of natural language (the latter being natively more complex). In addition, this language will be machine readable and will be the input of the MEDINA Assessment Tools. The methodology followed by the consortium to achieve the ultimate Cloud Certification Language is defined in next section.

7.2 Methodology

For a lean and seamless *trait d'union* between what is dictated by official documents of the European Commission in terms of certification and the definition of the MEDINA DSL, we intend to proceed as follows:

- 1) Semi-automatically translate Natural Language (NL) certifications terms and conditions, as they appear on official documents like the EUCS scheme, into policies expressed in a Controlled Natural Language (CNL).
- 2) Visualize and possibly revise the generated CNL via a CNL editor tool, to verify the generated policy statements before proceeding with the mapping to the MEDINA DSL.
- Map the CNL to a runtime-enforceable DSL language that can be used by the MEDINA assessment tools to check the compliance status of the certification terms and conditions.

We highlight the components of the MEDINA architecture that constitute the building blocks to achieve the Cloud Certification Language:

- The *NL2CNL Translator* translates EUCS NL requirements into their MEDINA CNL representation. Part of the translation from NL to CNL will be done via NLP techniques. The *NL2CNL Translator* is the main output of MEDINA Task 2.3.
- The *CNL Editor* is the user interface that allows users to visualize and possibly revise the translation of the requirements into the MEDINA CNL. The *CNL editor* is the main output of Task 2.4.
- The *DSL Mapper* is the MEDINA component that maps the yet not executable MEDINA CNL into the MEDINA Domain Specific Language (DSL), whose statements are instead machine-readable. The DSL is the Cloud Certification Language. The *DSL mapper* is the main output of Task 2.5.

All the components interface with the *Catalogue of controls and metrics,* are described in deliverable D2.2 [8]. For the representation of the requirements, all the components rely on the MEDINA Ontology, see *APPENDIX D: MEDINA Vocabularies and Ontologies*.

7.3 Architecture

The architecture of the MEDINA framework has been first proposed in the deliverable D5.1 [11] and updated in the deliverable D5.2 [7]. It is composed by eight building blocks, as shown in Figure 17 each of them corresponding to a well differentiated functionality. The Cloud Security Certification Language corresponds to block n. 2.






Figure 17. Building blocks view of the MEDINA framework (source: D5.2 [7])

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For the sake of clarity, Figure 18 shows a more detailed schema of the components and architecture of block n.2, that will be briefly introduced afterwards.




Figure 18. Architecture of the components involved in the Cloud Security Certification Language

The following are the components of the MEDINA architecture involved in block n.2 that achieve the Cloud Security Certification Language:

- The **Metric Recommender** associates a set of metrics to a requirement, by exploiting Natural Language Processing techniques. It is a sub-component of the NL2CNL Translator and is part of Task 2.4.
- The NL2CNL Translator translates EUCS NL requirements and metrics into their MEDINA CNL representation. The NL2CNL Translator is the main output of MEDINA Task 2.3.
- The **CNL Editor** is the user interface that allows users to visualize and possibly revise the translation of the requirements and metrics into the MEDINA CNL. The CNL Editor is the main output of Task 2.4.
- The **CNL Store** is a database that serves as output for the NL2CNL Translator and as input for the CNL Editor. It is controlled by the CNL Editor and can be accessed through its API to read and write objects in it. The objects stored in this DB are written by the NL2CNL Translator and are read by the CNL Editor and the DSL Mapper.
- The **DSL Mapper** is the MEDINA component that maps the yet not executable MEDINA CNL into the MEDINA Domain Specific Language DSL, whose statements are instead machine-readable. Therefore, the DSL is the Cloud Certification Language. The DSL Mapper is the main output of Task 2.5.
- The **MEDINA Ontology** was introduced in D2.3 [3] and recalled in this document in *APPENDIX D: MEDINA Vocabularies and Ontologies.* It is used by all the Cloud Security Certification Language components for the representation of the requirements and metrics.

The components presented so far interact with the following components in the other blocks of the MEDINA framework to perform their operations:

- The **Catalogue of Controls and Metrics** (a.k.a. Catalogue) belongs to block n.1 and has been described D2.2 [8]. The interaction with this component is necessary since the NL2CNL Translator needs to retrieve the requirements and metrics descriptions from it. The two components connect to each other via their respective APIs.
- The **Orchestrator** has been described in D3.3 [5] and D3.6 [6]. The entire translation process begins and ends in the *Orchestrator*. In fact, the *Orchestrator* UI allows the user to select the requirements to be translated and to send them to the NL2CNL Translator. Finally, the result of the translation is sent to the *Orchestrator* itself through the *DSL Mapper*. Both the *Orchestrator* and the *DSL Mapper* expose an API to perform all necessary operations.

7.4 Sequence diagram

The interaction among the various components of the MEDINA framework follows predefined flows, which are detailed in D5.4 [9]. Among these workflows, the one that involves the components of the Cloud Security Certification Language is the general workflow WF3 [9]. In particular, the step involved is step n.3.

Workflow	Step	Description	Role	Comments
	1	The Company Compliance Dashboard / Integrated UI is used to perform the following actions: Each Resource comprising the Cloud Service is registered in MEDINA as part of the ToC.	CSP	Required information from the Resource include the impact level mentioned in WF1. Additional attributes of the Resource are populated as needed and based on the MEDINA data model.
WF3	2	The Catalogue of Controls and Metrics (UI) is used to: Select EUCS Assurance level for the ToC to certify	CSP	The default value being "High" (which is the one requiring continuous monitoring in EUCS), but also "Basic" and "Substantial" can be selected.
WF3	3	 The UI from the CNL Editor is used to: a. Select suitable built-in Metrics as provided by the Metrics Recommender (or accept the ones pre-selected by default) Customize Target Values²³ on the selected built-in Metrics. 	CSP	Once the corresponding Obligations have been selected and configured with a Target Value (including the corresponding Metric), then they are ready to be stored along with the ToC information in MEDINA's Orchestrator.
	4	The Organizational Evidence Gathering and Processing is used to upload the collected documentation (see WF1)	CSP	These documents are stored directly on the database of the component, and not on the Orchestrator's.

Table 7. Description of the general workflow WF3, which involves the Cloud Security Certification
Language components

²³ In the form of Obligations

Workflow	Step	Description	Role	Comments
	5	The Orchestrator stores the configured	MEDIN	n/a
		ToC information (see steps 1-3) in its	А	
		corresponding database.		

This step n.3 is made explicit in the sequence diagram depicted in Figure 19.




Figure 19. Sequence diagram describing the interaction among the Cloud Security Certification Language components

The sequence diagram includes the following steps:

- 1. The Cloud Security Certification Language functionality is activated from the Unified User Interface (UUI) of the MEDINA framework, which allows the user to access the *Orchestrator* User Interface (UI) and to select a (set of) requirements to be assessed.
- 2. The chosen requirement is sent from the *Orchestrator* to the *NL2CNL Translator*, thus triggering the translation/recommendation.
- 3. The *NL2CNL Translator* connects to the *Catalogue* to retrieve information related to requirements and metrics, in particular, it retrieves, for a certain requirement, all the metrics already associated to it in the *Catalogue*.
- 4. The *Catalogue* responds with the information required, if available.
- 5. The *NL2CNL Translator* queries the Metric Recommender with the requirement(s) specified by the user through the *Orchestrator* UI.
- 6. The Metric Recommender returns a set of metrics associated to a requirement. In the *Catalogue*, each metric is already linked to a requirement or to a set of requirements and this association has been made by an expert when constructing the *Catalogue*. The metrics returned by the Metric Recommender are different from the ones already linked to it in the *Catalogue* and they are useful for having a larger list of metrics to choose from.
- 7. The *NL2CNL Translator* translates all the metrics/requirements pairs into obligations, then it builds an object containing all the information needed to describe a requirement and its associated metrics/obligations. This object is called REO (Requirement&Obligation) and it is represented in XML. The REO object is sent from the *NL2CNL Translator* to the *CNL Editor*, which takes care of storing it into the CNL Store.
- 8. The control returns to the UUI, giving the user the possibility to open the *CNL Editor* and view/revise the obligations.

- 9. Once satisfied with the obligations, the user can directly trigger the mapping from the *CNL Editor* UI, by sending the REO object to be mapped to the *DSL Mapper*.
- 10. The *DSL Mapper* extracts from the REO object the information needed to generate the Rego rules, which are finally sent back to the *Orchestrator*.

7.5 Coverage of requirements

This section provides an overview of the status of the functional requirements updated until M30, focusing on those requirements related to the Cloud Security Certification Language. indicates, for each functional requirement, its priority, and its current and expected implementation status.

Requirements have been classified as *Not Implemented* (-), *Partially implemented* (*P*) or *Fully implemented* (*F*). The columns M15, M24, and M30 refer to the month where the status has been measured. **M15** correspond to the first version of the requirements, **M24** refers to status in month 24, **M30** refers to the actual status, previous to the final MEDINA integration in M33.

Each requirement will be described in detail in the following sections.

Table 8. Expected coverage of functional requirements for the Cloud Security Certification Language.

KR	Sub- component	Req. ID	Short title	Priority	M15	M24	M30
	NL2CNL Translator	NL2CNL.01	Translation from NL to Controlled NL	MUST	Ρ	Р	F
		NL2CNL.02	Based on NLP and ontologies	MUST	-	Ρ	F
		NL2CNL.03	Translation of org. and technical measures	Should	Ρ	Ρ	F
		NL2CNL.04	Compliant with the CNL Editor language	MUST	Ρ	Ρ	F
KR3	CNL Editor	CNLE.01	CNL Editor GUI	MUST	-	F	F
Certification		CNLE.03	CNL Editor input format	Should	-	F	F
Language		CNLE.04	CNL Editor policies changing	MUST	Р	F	F
		CNLE.05	CNL Editor vocabulary	MUST	-	Р	F
		CNLE.06	CNL Editor output format	MUST	Р	F	F
	DSL Mapper	DSLM.01	Translation to selected DSL	MUST	-	Р	F
		DSLM.03	Mapping elements	MUST	-	Р	F

8 APPENDIX B: Patterns and Controlled Natural Languages for Requirements specifications

This section introduces Controlled Natural Languages (CNLs) and their benefits in various fields of applications, including the MEDINA scenario.

Quoting from [12], 'natural language (NL) is pervasive in [...] requirements specifications (RSs). However, despite its popularity and widespread use, NL is highly prone to quality issues such as vagueness, ambiguity, and incompleteness.' Work in [13] identifies common issues affecting usability of NL requirements, like, e.g., the adoption of an unclear – or a too complex, or too poor – terminology, the missing of a requirements specification template, the duplication of requirements that simply use a diverse wordiness, the omission of significant descriptions, the vagueness and the ambiguity of terms and meaning.

With the aim of improving the quality of NL requirements, by, e.g., reducing its ambiguity and making them more precise and complete, Pohl proposes the following three approaches [14]:

- **Glossaries**. Requirements glossaries are lists of specific words that make explicit and provide definitions for the salient terms in a Requirement Specification. Glossaries may also provide information about the synonyms, related terms, and example usages of the salient terms [15].
- **Patterns**. Patterns are pre-defined sentence structures with optional and mandatory components. Patterns guide stakeholders in writing more standardized NL requirements by restricting their syntax, and thus possibly avoiding omissions and/or over-specifications.
- **Controlled natural languages**. Controlled natural languages (CNLs) are a subset of natural languages, specifically conceived to make language processing simpler. A CNL is, in essence, a developed language that is based on natural language, but is more restrictive in terms of lexicon, syntax, semantics, while at the same time retaining most of its natural properties. CNLs prevent quality problems in requirements documents, while maintaining the flexibility to write and communicate requirements in an intuitive and universally understood manner [16]. CNLs are considered an extension of the pattern category which, in addition to restricting the syntax (the grammatical structures), also provide language constructs with which it is possible to precisely define the semantics of NL requirements. By adopting a contrived representation, in terms of grammar and vocabulary, CNLs may reduce the ambiguity and complexity of a complete language [17], e.g., English, Spanish, French, Swedish, Mandarin, etc. [18].

In the following, we will concentrate on the last two approaches (patterns and CNLs), being language representations the target of this section.

8.1 Patterns

Many patterns have been proposed in the literature. In [19], Pohl and Rupp present a single pattern to specify functional software requirements, while Mavin et al., in [20], consider the aviation domain and propose a set of fine patterns to describe functionalities of the domain. Requirements writing according to these patterns has been proved to be easier to understand and less ambiguous.

Both functional and not functional requirements have been presented in [21] by Withall, all related to the business domain, while Riaz et al. in [22] define a set of patterns expressing security requirements. The latter comes with an assistant tool that helps the user in selecting the appropriate pattern according to the security aspects relevant in the NL requirement.

Among others, we cite here two other works specifying patterns for the description of embedded systems (Denger et al. [23]) and performance requirements (Eckhardt et al. [24]).

From this non-exhaustive review of existing patterns for drafting NL requirements, we can see that many of them are domain-dependent, that is, laced with terms specific to a certain domain.

8.2 Controlled Natural Languages

CNLs have been proved to be effective in mitigating linguistic ambiguity challenges, as they can easily be translated into a formal language such as first-order logic or different version of description logic, automatically and mostly deterministically (Schwitter, [17]). CNLs are formal *per se*, being born with an associated formal semantics. In section 8.3, we will give an example of the semantics for a language ideated by some members of the MEDINA consortium and conceived for expressing privacy regulations (Matteucci et al, [25]). In general, CNLs can conveniently express the kind of information that occurs in, e.g., software specifications, formal ontologies, business rules, legal and medical regulations.

One interesting feature of CNLs is that they usually maintain a readability that is not so different from that of pure natural languages. This makes them easier to write and understand by people than pure formal languages. Furthermore, they precisely define subsets of natural languages, have a formal foundation and can therefore be adopted for automated reasoning (Schwitter, [17]).

CNLs have been proposed and used in many application domains and for different purposes. For example, the Attempto Controlled English (ACE)²⁴ [26] is a CNL that defines a subset of the English language intended to be used in different domains, such as software specification and the Semantic Web. Attempto can be automatically translated into first-order logic and is supported by a number of tools, like a Parsing Engine to translate ACE texts into a variant of first-order logic, or a plug-in for the Protége ontology editor²⁵.

In [27], Hart et al. propose Rabbit as a way to overcome the impediment to the creation and adoption of ontologies. Rabbit is a CNL that can be translated into the Ontology Web Language²⁶ (OWL) in a way that achieves both comprehension by domain experts and computational preciseness. In a sense, Rabbit can be defined as complementary to OWL, supporting the need to author and understand domain ontologies but overcoming the difficult comprehension of descriptions logics.

Similarly, the idea behind the Sidney OWL Syntax (SOS) [28] is to propose a new syntax that can be used to write and read OWL ontologies in CNLs. SOS enables the generation of grammatically correct full English sentences to and from OWL syntax. This enables users to write an OWL ontology in a defined subset of English, also improving readability and understanding of OWL statements.

Regarding CNLs developed for specific domains, as an example Konrad and Cheng in [29] consider the automotive domain and propose a language to express real-time properties of systems under specification. As a follow-up of the same language, Post et al in [30] enlarge its expressivity to express other requirements in the same domain.

Just like other types of requirements, EUCS controls and requirements are expressed in natural language. Although the use of natural language enables users (e.g., CSPs) to read and

²⁴ <u>http://attempto.ifi.uzh.ch/site/</u>

²⁵ https://protege.stanford.edu/

²⁶ <u>https://www.w3.org/OWL/</u>

understand the requirements specific for Cloud Security Certification, a key issue relies in the fact that NLs are not machine readable, and automatic measurements on whether controls and requirements are actually going to be processed and fulfilled are not feasible. In particular, NL cannot be used as the input language for a rule-assessment software infrastructure to be used for automated, continuous evaluation of requirements' fulfilment. In fact, such an evaluation requires inputs in a machine-readable form, like, e.g., the de facto standard XACML moving to the field of access control rules.

Like other (cloud) certification schemes, the EUCS scheme controls are groups of statements – the requirements indeed - that can be likened to policies. There are several examples of CNLs coined by Academia and Industry to express such policies. In the following, we introduce the reader to languages expressing policies for data management, including the one that has inspired our MEDINA CNL.

8.3 CNLs for expressing policies for secure data management

In the last two decades, data protection has been discussed in many scenarios, from critical infrastructures to social networks, just to cite two fields of interest. Informally, regulations for data protection, data storage and data sharing are written in Natural Language^{27,28}. A proper CNL is a flexible mean to fill the gap between a traditional legal contract regulating the sharing of data among different domains, and the software architecture supporting it.

Some examples of languages and associated tools for secure data management are as follows:

- Binder [31] is an open logic-based security language that encodes security authorizations among components of communicating distributed systems.
- The Rodin platform provides an animation and model-checking toolset, for analysing properties of specifications based on the Event-B language²⁹, able to express security data policies. In [32], the developers of Rodin and Event-B presented a formalization of data management clauses in Event-B, and a model checker is exploited to verify that a system behaves according to its associated clauses.
- Also, work in [33] proposes a comprehensive framework for expressing highly complex privacy-related policies, featuring purposes and obligations. The Klaim family of process calculi [34] provides a high-level model for distributed systems, for programming and controlling access and usage of resources. Also, work in [35] considers policies that moderate the use and replication of information, e.g., imposing that a certain information may only be used or copied a certain number of times. The analysis tool is a static analyser for a variant of Klaim.

We will now describe a language defined by some members of the MEDINA consortium in a previous work. The *Controlled Natural Language* for *Data Sharing Agreement* (CNL4DSA) was introduced with the purpose to reduce the barrier of adoption of data policies in terms of security and privacy as well as to ensure policies mapping to formal languages that allow the automatic verification of the policies [25]. A data sharing agreement is essentially a contract between two or more parties to agree on some terms and conditions with respect to data sharing, storage, and usage. This language, called for the sake of brevity CNL4DSA, permits simple, yet formal, specifications of different classes of privacy policies, as listed below:

 ²⁷ Justice Information Sharing, U.S. Dept. of Justice. Online: <u>https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it</u>
 ²⁸ North American Electronic Reliability Corporation. Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center.
 Online: <u>https://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Pages/default.aspx</u>
 ²⁹ http://www.event-b.org/platform.html

- *authorizations*, expressing the permission for subjects to perform actions on objects (e.g., data), under specific contextual conditions
- *obligations*, defining that subjects are obliged to perform actions on objects, under specific contextual conditions.

Central to CNL4DSA is the notion of *fragment*, i.e., a tuple $f = \langle s, a, o \rangle$ where s is the subject, a is the action, o is the object. A fragment simply says that `subject s performs action a on object o'.

By adding the can/must constructs to the basic fragment, a fragment becomes an *authorization* or an *obligation*.

Fragments are evaluated within a specific context *c*, i.e., a predicate that characterizes factors such as user's roles, data categories, time, geographical locations, etc. Contexts are evaluated either as true or false. Simple examples of contexts are `subject hasRole CSP', or `object hasCategory CloudResource'. In order to describe complex policies, contexts are composable. A *composite context C* is defined inductively as follows

 $C = c \mid C \text{ and } C \mid C \text{ or } C \mid \text{ not } C$

Where **and**, **or**, and **not** are Boolean connectors.

The syntax of a composite fragment $F_{\mbox{\scriptsize M}}$ is described by the following Backus-Naur Form BNF-like syntax:

$$F_M = nil \mid \mathbf{mod} f \mid F_M; F_M \mid if C then F_M$$

where the modality **mod** ranges over {**can**, **must**} and the subscript *M* ranges over {*A*, *O*} where *A* stands for Authorization and *O* stands for Obligation. By changing the modality and the subscript, we get two different types of policies, namely we have authorizations and obligations. F_A is a composite authorization fragment and F_O is a composite obligation fragment.

Let us now comment on the individual policy constructors:

- *nil* does nothing.
- mod f is the atomic authorization/obligation fragment that expresses that f = <s,a,o> is allowed/obliged. Its informal meaning is that "subject s can/must perform action a on object o".
- F_M ; F_M is a list of composite fragments. (Subscript *M* takes either only *O* or only *A*).
- If C then F_M expresses the logical implication between a composite context C and a composite fragment F_M : if C holds, then F_M is permitted/obliged (according to the value of M).

CNL4DSA has an operational semantics based on a Modal Transition System (MTS), able to express *admissible* and *necessary* requirements to the behaviour of the CNL4DSA specification. To model the behaviour of the specifications, modal transition systems are used. In its original version [36], MTS is a structure

$$(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}, \rightarrow \Diamond, \rightarrow \boxdot)$$

where ${\mathcal S}$ is a set of specifications, like for example processes in the context of Process Algebras,

 \mathcal{A} is the set of actions which specifications may perform, and $\rightarrow \emptyset, \rightarrow \boxdot \subseteq S \times \mathcal{A} \times S$ are the two modal transition relations expressing admissible and necessary requirements to the behaviour of the specifications.

In particular, $S \xrightarrow{a} \Diamond S'$ with S, S' $\in S$ and $a \in \mathcal{A}$ means that it is admissible that the implementation of S performs a and then behaves like S'. Dually, $S \xrightarrow{a} \boxdot S'$ represents a transition in which the implementation of S is required to perform a and then behaves like S'.

This works under the assumption that all the required transitions are admissible transitions.

Figure 20 shows the operational semantics of F_A in terms of a modified label transition system $MTS_{Auth} = (AUT, F, \rightarrow 0, C)$. As usual, rules are expressed in terms of a set of premises, possibly empty (above the line) and a conclusion (below the line).

Let \rightarrow_{\Diamond} be the smallest subset of $\mathcal{AUTH} \times \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{AUTH}$, closed under the following rules:

$$(can) \frac{(can) \frac{f}{can f \xrightarrow{f} \Diamond nil}}{(f) \frac{f}{F1_A; F2_A} \xrightarrow{f} \Diamond F1'_A; F2_A} (if) \frac{C = true \quad F_A \xrightarrow{f} \Diamond F'_A}{if \ C \ then \ F_A \xrightarrow{f} \Diamond F'_A}$$

Figure 20. Operational Semantics for the composite authorization fragment, where the symmetric rule for (;) is omitted (source: unpublished manuscript, Petrocchi M and Matteucci I.)

MTS_{Auth} deals with authorized transitions only and it also considers the set of contexts because the transitions may depend also on the value of such contexts, see rule (*if*) in Figure 20.

The introduction of C (= a set of predicates) in a labelled transition system is a standard practice [37]. We observe that the *if* operator implies the binding of variable appearing in the context *C*.

The operational semantics of F_0 is expressed in terms of the modal transition system $MTS_{Obl} = (OBL, \mathcal{F}, \rightarrow \boxdot, \mathcal{C})$. The axioms and rules are similar to the ones presented for F_A apart from changing the transition relation, that becomes $\rightarrow \boxdot$.

8.4 MEDINA CNL

In this section, we introduce the definition of the MEDINA CNL, along with the motivations leading to this format.

We remind the reader that the scope of the certification requirements for MEDINA was first defined in D2.1 (section 3.1) [1] and then confirmed in D2.2 [8]. We focus on a subset of EUCS requirements that were identified from the draft version of the EUCS scheme [10]. These requirements were selected based on two requisites: i) their 'assurance level' is 'high'; and ii) they include the wording "automatically monitor" or variations thereof.

Inspired by the presence of the authorization and obligation modalities in CNL4DSA, presented in the previous section, we further analysed the EUCS draft candidate certification scheme and were able to summarize the requirements, being either technical or organizational [5], in the following general textual formula:

The value assumed by the metric x on the resource of type y can/must be equal/major to/minor to the target value z/must fall in the range of values $\{z, ...w\}$.

Paraphrasing part of CNL4DSA, we define a MEDINA fragment as a tuple

f = <*rt*, *m*, *type(op,tv)*>

where rt is a resource type, m is a metric, type(op,tv) specifies the type of the metric, the designed target value tv for that metric, and the operator op which relates the value of the metric to tv (e.g., =, >, <, etc.).

A MEDINA fragment says that "the metric *m*, measured on the resource type *rt*, has a specific relation with the value *tv* of type *type*, based on the operator *op*".

This leads to the following syntax for the MEDINA CNL:

$$F_M = nil \mid \mathbf{mod} f \mid F_M; F_M$$

where *M* ranges over {*A*, *O*} (Authorization/Obligation) and

- nil does nothing.
- mod f is the atomic authorization/obligation MEDINA fragment that expresses that f = <rt, m, type(op,tv)> is allowed/obliged. Its informal meaning is that "the metric m, measured on the resource type rt, can/must have a specific relation with the value tv of type type, based on the operator op".
- F_M ; F_M is a list of composite MEDINA fragments.

The analysis of the EUCS certification scheme and connected metrics, set forth in D2.1 [1] and confirmed in D2.2 [8], have highlighted how the requirements identified can be viewed as *obligations*. In particular, the CSP must fulfil specific obligations regarding, e.g., the security configurations of cloud resources.

For this reason, the format for expressing in a more formal, but always readable way, the NL requirement, is represented as follows:

must <*rt*, *m*, *type*(*op*,*tv*)>

With a little abuse of notation, we will express the MEDINA obligation in this format too:

RT must M type(op,tv)

where, as introduced above, **RT** is the resource type, **M** is a metric associated to the requirement, **tv** is a target value, **op** is the comparison operator, which indicates how to compare the target value with the value measured on the resource, with respect to metric **M**; finally, **type** indicates the unit of measure of the target value and the measured value.

It is worth noting that, having included both the *must* and the *can* modalities in the MEDINA CNL, it will be possible – when and if necessary – to express not only obligation requirements but also authorization requirements. Also, it will be possible to express a list of composite MEDINA fragments.

APPENDIX C: From NL to CNL TOMs will show some concrete examples of requirements rendered into the MEDINA obligations.

As a final note, it is fair to point out that other projects have developed more complex languages, and also equipped them with tools devoted to analysing properties of the system that such languages describe. This is the case, for example, of the AMASS (Architecture-driven, Multi-concern and Seamless Assurance and Certification of Cyber-Physical Systems)³⁰ European project. The target of AMASS is the specification of safety and security requirements for Cyber-

³⁰ https://www.amass-ecsel.eu/

Physical Systems, which probably feature many variabilities in their specification than requirements for cloud security certification.

AMASS includes multiple modelling languages according to the level of user expertise. They can be based on UML, associated with editor tools with many plug-ins or have formal foundation and as such can be given as specification to property verification tools (see AMASS Deliverable 3.6 "Prototype for architecture-driven assurance" [38]).

The language chosen to represent MEDINA's requirements is a much simpler language, with no correlated analysis tools. However, we argue that the language is suitable for MEDINA's purpose, which is to create a close-to-standard language for the representation of cloud certification requirements, and which is then made machine readable and input to the assessment tools specified in D3.3 [5].

9 APPENDIX C: From NL to CNL TOMs

The main goal of passing from a NL representation to a CNL representation of the security requirements and associated metrics is to help achieving the automatic and continuous monitoring of the EUCS scheme.

This process is carried out through two consecutive steps. The first step consists in associating each requirement with one or more predefined metrics. In fact, to get a compliance status, each requirement needs to be objectively evaluated and thus it should be associated with metrics that reflect the technical details of the requirement itself. The second step is represented by the translation of each requirement / associated metric into a policy, expressed in CNL. The two steps will be detailed in the following sections. In particular, the first section describes the proposal of a system to automatically associate metrics to requirements, whereas the second one reports the actual translation of requirements/metrics into policies.

Figure 21 depicts the simplified workflow of Task 2.3: first, for every requirement, a set of metrics is recommended/predicted, then the set is translated into the defined CNL. The output is stored in a dedicated database managed by the *CNL Editor*, since it will be used by the Editor itself to visualize/refine the result of the recommendation.




Figure 21. From Natural Language to Controlled Natural Language: Simplified overview Metric association

This section explains the process carried out to automatically associate metrics to requirements. The idea behind this proposal comes from the fact that the metrics should be reusable when adding new requirements and the manual association between metrics and requirements is a time-consuming process. For these reasons, a tool for automatic association is proposed, namely a "metric recommender" system.

Input data (requirements and metrics, both expressed in NL) are selected from the MEDINA catalogue database and fed into the recommender system. The idea is to associate metrics to a requirement according to the similarity of their descriptions. To do so, both requirements and metrics descriptions are represented into vectors of numerical features by relying on NLP techniques, with the hypothesis that similar requirements and features descriptions will reside in the same local area in the feature space. The quality of the process is actively supervised in visual analysis and experiment results are computed using state of the art metrics. The following subsections will give more details about this process.

9.1.1 Data and features

The input of the metric recommender system is taken from the *Catalogue of controls and metrics*, which currently includes the requirements available in the EUCS scheme [10]. In particular, the first input is represented by the natural language description of the requirements. The natural language description of the metrics is also used as a second input for the metric recommender system.

Requirement input data example

The following is an example for a high-level security requirement description in natural language (ReqID=*OIS-02.3H*, category=*Organisation of Information Security*):

The CSP introduces and maintains a manually managed inventory of conflicting roles and enforces the segregation of duties during the assignment or modification of roles as part of the role management process. OIS-02.3H

Metric input data example

The following is an example for a metric description in natural language:

"This metric is used to assess if access monitoring is enabled" M237 - MEDINA metric proposal

9.1.2 Experimental setup

First, the input texts are processed using a pre-trained network to produce a high dimensional feature vector. This feature vector represents the requirement or metric in a mathematically comparable way, instead of their original textual description. The basis for the recommender system is the hypothesis that requirements having similar descriptions are expected to be closer in the feature space. Since the same features are also computed for the metrics, this should also hold for the metrics. Which means, that, if the features are selected/fine-tuned to this purpose, the metrics, that should be associated with a requirement, are in the same local area in this high dimensional feature space.

9.1.2.1 Features

As described above, the input for the metric recommender system, i.e., the model that associates metrics with a requirement, is the computed feature vectors. The features can be computed using knowledge of the domain (e.g., for audio, spectrograms can be used). Alternatively, the features can be learned using machine learning. To train such a model, usually a lot of data is needed (in our case text), which is not available. Therefore, we use the output of pre-trained models that have worked well on state-of-the-art Natural Language Processing tasks.

For our use case, two types of features are considered applicable – the ones related to contextaware models (e.g. BERT [39] and derivatives [40]) and context-free word embeddings (e.g. word2vec [41] or fastText [42]). In the first experiments, fastText features (on metric/requirement description text) have shown the most promising results.

The quality of the selected features directly influences the final result; therefore, some data cleaning is needed. In our case, this is mostly based on removing stop words [43]. This means that we remove words that appear often, but do not add useful information to the text.




Figure 22. Feature computation workflow

9.1.2.2 Current approach

Features are computed using the fastText model *cc.en.300* which returns a 300-dimensional vector per requirement/metric (see Figure 22.). The fastText model is pre-trained on English texts from Wikipedia and Common Crawl [44]. For visual analysis, this high dimensional vector is reduced to two dimensions using the principal component analysis (PCA) [45] or the T-distributed Stochastic Neighbour Embedding (TSNE) [46] or the Truncated SVD [47].

A K-d tree is computed on the feature vectors of the metrics, which can be used to select the k closest neighbours of a query vector, based on the shortest Euclidean distance. As a query, we use the feature vector of a requirement. The workflow is depicted in Figure 23, and result examples are provided in the following sections.




Figure 23. Recommender system workflow

9.1.2.3 Performance indicators

To analyse the performance of our system, basic indicators can be used. These indicators allow us to compare different approaches and help choosing the most promising one. Precision@K is typically the metric of choice for evaluating the performance of a recommender systems. However, additional diagnostic metrics and visualizations can be used, since they can offer deeper insights into a model's performance. First experiments results are based on the following indicators.

Precision@k

A quality metric to evaluate model's performance could be *precision@k* [48], e.g., *precision@5* reflects how well the system performs in the top 5 recommendation results. However, this score does not consider the rank of the relevant metrics only whether the relevant metrics are in the set of retrieved metrics. Equation 1 shows the adjusted formula to calculate the precision@k score for this task. The numerator in Equation 1 is the amount of metrics in the intersection of *relevant metrics* (=metrics associated with a requirement) and *k* is the number of *relevant metrics* (=recommended metrics for a requirement), the denominator is the amount of *relevant metrics*.

$$precision@k = \frac{|\{relevant metrics\} \cap \{k \ retrieved \ metrics\}|}{|\{relevant \ metrics\}|}$$
Equation 1

Normalised Discounted Cumulative Gain nDCG

An alternative quality metric to *precision@k* is the Discounted Cumulative Gain [49] (DCG), which is an indicator that can be used to measure the quality of our recommender system results, including the rank of relevant documents. The resulting metric list is ranked, and the metrics associated with the query requirement (=relevant documents) receive a relevance score $rel_i=1$, while metrics not relevant are set to $rel_i=0$. The position of the document/metric is denoted by *i*. The DCG is calculated as defined in Equation 2. To make the DCG metric comparable to other results it needs to be normalized – therefore an ideal DCG (Equation 3) is calculated, reflecting the ideal result – all associated metrics are in the top results of the recommender. The DCG is normalized to a score between 0 and 1 using the ratio of *DCG* to *IDCG* (Equation 4).

$$DCG_p = \sum_{i=1}^{p} \frac{2^{rel_i} - 1}{\log_2(i+1)}$$
 Equation 2

$$IDCG_p = \sum_{i=1}^{|REL_p|} \frac{2^{rel_i} - 1}{log_2(i+1)}$$

 $nDCG_p = \frac{DCG_p}{IDCG_p}$ Equation 4

9.1.3 First results

For the purpose of testing the performances of the metric recommender we considered 34 requirements, which have been manually associated with 123 metrics in total (see D2.2 [8]). This means that these can be actively used for testing this recommender system prototype. So far, the quality of the approach was visually analysed using interactive plots and filtering of the results and measured using the above defined nDCG.

9.1.3.1 Visual analysis

Figure 24 depicts three plots using the first two components of the down-projected features. The reduction has been done using TSNE, PCA and Truncated SVD, from left to right. Each coloured dot represents either a requirement or a metric. Visual analysis indicates that the

Equation 3

features are mostly good, as the distribution of different schemes and metrics are clustered on top of each other. This empirically supports the hypothesis the recommender system is built on.

Especially in the PCA plot, it is noticeable that some metrics are skewed. Using the interactive analysis tool built for examining the data, anomalies such as this one can be directly investigated.




Figure 24. Plot of requirements and metrics using the first two components of the feature vectors, downprojected using TSNE, PCA and Truncated SVD respectively

9.1.3.2 Results

For 27 out of 34 requirements at least a subset of the linked metrics could be retrieved within the top 10 results (see Figure 25 and Figure 26). For the rest 7 requirements, no metrics could be retrieved (for an example see Figure 27). In total the mean of the nDCG is 0.41.

Disregarding the 7 requirements, for which no metrics could be retrieved yet, the "corrected" mean nDCG is 0.66. For 12 requirements 100% of the associated metrics were retrieved in the top results. An example of the latter can be seen in Figure 25.

Query:

	ID	ReqID	EUCS Control ID	Description
85	AM-01.6	NaN	AM-01	The CSP shall automatically monitor the inventory of assets to guarantee it is up-to-date

Mapped metrics:

		ID	ReqID	EUCS Control ID	Description	relevance	rank
ĺ	68	M212	AM-01.6	AM-01	This metric is used to assess if the inventory of assets is regularly monitored	1	1
	69	M213	AM-01.6	AM-01	This metric is used to assess if the inventory if assets are regularly monitored against policies	1	2

Recommended:

	ID	ReqID	EUCS Control ID	Description	relevance	rank
69	M213	AM-01.6	AM-01	This metric is used to assess if the inventory if assets are regularly monitored against policies	1	1
68	M212	AM-01.6	AM-01	This metric is used to assess if the inventory of assets is regularly monitored	1	2
7	M155	HR-03.5	HR-03	Check if there is a possibility to monitor the verification of acknowledgement of security policies automatically	0	3
8	M156	HR-04.7	HR-04	Check if exists a possibility to monitor the completion of the security awareness and training program automatically	0	4
78	M222	PM-04.7	PM-04	The check that exists an automatic functionality to monitor compliance	0	5
19	M164	PSS-04.3	PSS-04	Are integrity checks of VM and container images automatically monitored?	0	6
87	M231	ISP-03.7	ISP-03	Check if security approvals and exceptions are automatically monitored	0	7
79	M223	PM-04.7	PM-04	The check that the results of the monitoring automatically use in the listed procedures: • Configuration of system components;/n• Performance and availability of system components;/n• Response time to malfunctions and security incidents; and/n• Recovery time (time until completion of error handling).	0	8
40	M184	OPS-07.2	OPS-07	This metric is used to assess if a self service portal for data backup monitoring is available.	0	9
109	M253	IAM-03.11	IAM-03	Monitoring for log events produced by automated mechanisms to check if they are working properly	0	10

DCG: 2.35. IDCG: 2.35 nDCG: 1.0

Figure 25. Prototypical results for EUCS requirement AM-01.6, optimal results on rank 1 and 2

Query:

	AM-03.6	NaN	AM-03	3 The approval of the commissioning and decommissioning of hardware shall be digitally documented and automatically	monitored.	
/ la	ippe	d me	trics:			
	ID	ReqID	EUCS Control ID	Description	relevance	ra
0	M214 A	M-03.6	AM-03	This metric is used to assess the existence of digital record of the commissioning requests including the approval or denial	1	
'1	M215 A	M-03.6	AM-03	This metric is used to assess the existence of digital record of the decommissioning requests including the approval or denial	1	
	oon	nmen	dadi			
ne	COII	imen	ueu.			
	ID	ReqID	EUCS Control ID	Description	relevance	ra
79	M223	PM-04.7	PM-04	The check that the results of the monitoring automatically use in the listed procedures: • Configuration of system components;/n• Performance and availability of system components;/n• Response time to malfunctions and security incidents; and/n• Recovery time (time until completion of error handling).	0	
34	M178b	IM-03.4	IM-03	This metric is used to assess if the automated incident remediation mechanism requires user approvals.	0	
74	M218	AM-04.4	AM-04	This metric is used to assess the existence of the information related to the verification of the secure configuration of the mechanisms for error handling, logging, encryption, authentication and authorisation according to the intended use and based on the applicable policies, before authorization to commission the asset can be granted	0	
09	M253	IAM-03.11	IAM-03	Monitoring for log events produced by automated mechanisms to check if they are working properly	0	
19	M164	PSS-04.3	PSS-04	Are integrity checks of VM and container images automatically monitored?	0	
87	M231	ISP-03.7	ISP-03	Check if security approvals and exceptions are automatically monitored	0	
71	M215	AM-03.6	AM-03	This metric is used to assess the existence of digital record of the decommissioning requests including the approval or denial	1	
	M214	AM-03.6	AM-03	This metric is used to assess the existence of digital record of the commissioning requests including the approval or denial	1	
70	M252	AM-04.4	AM-04	No. of alerts raised for employees without or outdated acknowledgment record	0	
70 08			HR-05	Check if exist external employees with accesses granted after termination or change of employment, which should have	0	

Figure 26. Prototypical results for EUCS requirement AM-03.6, results on rank 7 and 8

	10	ReqID	EUCS Control IE	D Description		
441	IM-03.4	NaN	IM-03	3 The CSP shall allow customers to actively approve the solution before automatically approving it after a certain period		
Mapped metrics:						
	ID	ReqID	EUCS Control ID	Description	relevance	ran
33	M178a	IM-03.4	IM-03	This metric is used to assess if automated incident management (detection, response) and SIEM has been enabled on a cloud service / asset	1	
34	M178b	IM-03.4	IM-03	This metric is used to assess if the automated incident remediation mechanism requires user approvals.	1	
89	M233	IM-03.4	IM-03	(BSI-C5 / Sim-04) Check if customers have the ability to review security incident solutions.	1	
90	M234	IM-03.4	IM-03	(BSI-C5 / Sim-04) Check if security incident solutions are up to date.	1	
Re	econ	nmer	nded:			
	ID	ReqID	EUCS Control ID	Description	relevance	rar
13		ReqID		Description Check if access rights are revoked on contract termination or change according to the decision making procedure automatically	relevance 0	rar
13	M158	· · ·	Control ID HR-05	Check if access rights are revoked on contract termination or change according to the decision making procedure		rar
74	M158 M218	HR-05.4	Control ID HR-05 AM-04	Check if access rights are revoked on contract termination or change according to the decision making procedure automatically This metric is used to assess the existence of the information related to the verification of the secure configuration of the mechanisms for error handling, logging, encryption, authentication and authorisation according to the intended use and	0	rar
74	M158 M218 M157b	HR-05.4 AM-04.4	Control ID HR-05 AM-04 HR-05	Check if access rights are revoked on contract termination or change according to the decision making procedure automatically This metric is used to assess the existence of the information related to the verification of the secure configuration of the mechanisms for error handling, logging, encryption, authentication and authorisation according to the intended use and based on the applicable policies, before authorization to commission the asset can be granted Check if exist external employees with accesses granted after termination or change of employment, which should have	0	rar
74	M158 M218 M157b	HR-05.4 AM-04.4 HR-05.4	Control ID HR-05 AM-04 HR-05	Check if access rights are revoked on contract termination or change according to the decision making procedure automatically This metric is used to assess the existence of the information related to the verification of the secure configuration of the mechanisms for error handling, logging, encryption, authentication and authorisation according to the intended use and based on the applicable policies, before authorization to commission the asset can be granted Check if exist external employees with accesses granted after termination or change of employment, which should have been revoked according to the outcomes of the decision-making procedure Check if exist internal employees with accesses granted after termination or change of employment, which should have	0	rai
74 10 9 7	M158 M218 M157b M157a	HR-05.4 AM-04.4 HR-05.4 HR-05.4	Control ID HR-05 AM-04 HR-05 HR-05	Check if access rights are revoked on contract termination or change according to the decision making procedure automatically This metric is used to assess the existence of the information related to the verification of the secure configuration of the mechanisms for error handling, logging, encryption, authentication and authorisation according to the intended use and based on the applicable policies, before authorization to commission the asset can be granted Check if exist external employees with accesses granted after termination or change of employment, which should have been revoked according to the outcomes of the decision-making procedure Check if exist internal employees with accesses granted after termination or change of employment, which should have been revoked according to the outcomes of the decision-making procedure	0	rar
74 10 9 7	M158 M218 M157b M157a M155	HR-05.4 AM-04.4 HR-05.4 HR-05.4 HR-03.5	Control ID HR-05 AM-04 HR-05 HR-05 HR-03	Check if access rights are revoked on contract termination or change according to the decision making procedure automatically. This metric is used to assess the existence of the information related to the verification of the secure configuration of the mechanisms for error handling, logging, encryption, authentication and authorisation according to the intended use and based on the applicable policies, before authorization to commission the asset can be granted. Check if exist external employees with accesses granted after termination or change of employment, which should have been revoked according to the outcomes of the decision-making procedure. Check if exist internal employees with accesses granted after termination or change of employment, which should have been revoked according to the outcomes of the decision-making procedure. Check if there is a possibility to monitor the verification of acknowledgement of security policies automatically. The check that the results of the monitoring automatically use in the listed procedures: Configuration of system components. ⁽¹⁾ re Response time to malfunctions and security	0 0 0 0	rar
24 0 9 7 9 8	M158 M218 M157b M157a M155 M223	HR-05.4 AM-04.4 HR-05.4 HR-05.4 HR-03.5 PM-04.7	Control ID HR-05 AM-04 HR-05 HR-05 HR-03 PM-04	Check if access rights are revoked on contract termination or change according to the decision making procedure automatically This metric is used to assess the existence of the information related to the verification of the secure configuration of the mechanisms for error handling, logging, encryption, authentication and authorisation according to the intended use and based on the applicable policies, before authorization to commission the asset can be granted Check if exist external employees with accesses granted after termination or change of employment, which should have been revoked according to the outcomes of the decision-making procedure Check if exist internal employees with accesses granted after termination or change of employment, which should have been revoked according to the outcomes of the decision-making procedure Check if there is a possibility to monitor the verification of acknowledgement of security policies automatically The check that the results of the monitoring automatically use in the listed procedures: • Configuration of system components;\n• Performance and availability of system components;\n• Response time to malfunctions and security incidents; and\n• Recovery time (time until completion of error handling).	0 0 0 0 0	
74 10 9 7	M158 M218 M157b M157a M155 M223 M156	HR-05.4 AM-04.4 HR-05.4 HR-03.5 PM-04.7 HR-04.7	Control ID HR-05 AM-04 HR-05 HR-03 PM-04 HR-04	Check if access rights are revoked on contract termination or change according to the decision making procedure automatically This metric is used to assess the existence of the information related to the verification of the secure configuration of the mechanisms for error handling, logging, encryption, authentication and authorisation according to the intended use and based on the applicable policies, before authorization to commission the asset can be granted Check if exist external employees with accesses granted after termination or change of employment, which should have been revoked according to the outcomes of the decision-making procedure Check if exist internal employees with accesses granted after termination or change of employment, which should have been revoked according to the outcomes of the decision-making procedure Check if there is a possibility to monitor the verification of acknowledgement of security policies automatically The check that the results of the monitoring automatically use in the listed procedures: • Configuration of system components;\n• Performance and availability of system components;\n• Response time to malfunctions and security incidents; and!n• Recovery time (time until completion of error handling). Check if exists a possibility to monitor the completion of the security awareness and training program automatically		

DCG: 0.0. IDCG: 3.7 nDCG: 0.0



9.2 CNL translations

Once the list of metrics associated to a requirement is obtained, it is possible to translate each pair requirement/metric in CNL. Here, we give some examples of translation from NL to CNL.

Let the reader consider the following requirement:

If we consider EUCS requirement ReqID = OPS-21.3, category Operational Security [10]

```
The CSP shall automatically monitor the service components under its responsibility for compliance with hardening specifications.
```

The metric recommender associates this requirement with the metric metricID=JavaVersion, whose description is: "This metric is used to assess the Java Runtime version used by the cloud service/asset". The metric data type is Integer in the range of [< 11; 11]. The target value is 11, and the operator that compares the target value with the measured value is "=". This metric can thus be expressed as the following obligation:

```
"Application" MUST "JavaVersion", Integer(=,11)
```

For the sake of clarity, we give another translation example:

If we consider EUCS requirement ReqID = PM-04.8, category Procurement Management [10]:

The CSP shall automatically monitor Identified violations and discrepancies, and these shall be automatically reported to the responsible personnel or system components of the Cloud Service Provider for prompt assessment and action.

The metric recommender associates this requirement with the metric metricID=AutomaticallyDetectedViolationsDiscrepancies, whose description is: "The percentage of violations and discrepancies which can be automatically detected". The metric data type is Integer, ranged over [0;100]. The target value is 100, and the operator that compares the target value with the measured value is "=". Then, this metric can be expressed as the following obligation:

```
"ComplianceMonitoringSoftware" MUST
"AutomaticallyDetectedViolationsDiscrepancies", Integer(=,100)
```

Finally, we report the example of a requirement associated with two different metrics, i.e., the requirement ReqID = OPS-5.3, category Operational Security:

The CSP shall automatically monitor the systems covered by the malware protection and the configuration of the corresponding mechanisms to guarantee fulfilment of OPS-05.1.

The metric recommender associates this requirement with metrics MetricID=MalwareProtectionEnabled and MetricID=MalwareProtectionOutput, respectively. The description of the metric MalwareProtectionEnabled is "This metric is used to assess if the antimalware solution is enabled on the respective resource", its data type is Boolean and the values it can assume are [true, false]. The default target value is "true" and the operator that compares the target value with the measured value is "=". Then, this metric is translated into the following obligation:

```
"Compute.VirtualMachine" MUST "MalwareProtectionEnabled",
Boolean(=,true)
```

Similarly, the description of the metric MalwareProtectionOutput is "These metric states whether automatic notifications are enabled (e.g. e-mail) about malware threats. This relates to EUCS definition of continuous monitoring". The metric data type is Boolean and the values it can assume are [true, false]. The default target value is "true" and the operator that compares the target value with the measured value is "=". Then, this metric is translated into the following obligation:

```
"Compute.VirtualMachine" MUST "MalwareProtectionOutput",
Boolean(=,true)
```

It is worth highlighting that the example obligations shown so far are reported in the CNL format, whereas in the actual implementation they will be rendered in XML, according to the language expected by the *CNL Editor*.

10 APPENDIX D: MEDINA Vocabularies and Ontologies

This section presents the MEDINA Ontologies that are at the base of the formation of CNL obligations in the CNL Editor Tool, and of the rules in Rego Code, the format chosen as the MEDINA Certification Language. Before introducing the ontologies, we will give a brief background on the concept of taxonomy and ontology.

10.1 Background: Taxonomies and Ontologies

Taxonomies are classifications of arbitrary objects, usually in a hierarchical order. Their purpose is to create abstract classes to which any concrete instance can be assigned. This way, general methods and tools can be developed that apply to all instances of a certain class. Taxonomies exist in many different domains, for example in biology to classify animals and plants or in computer science to classify security flaws or cloud resources (as proposed in MEDINA).

Sometimes, taxonomies are not sufficient to describe classes and their relationships. Ontologies can integrate several taxonomies and describe their relations in arbitrary ways. In MEDINA, for instance, we use an ontology to subsume two taxonomies which describe cloud resources and security features, and add relationships between the two taxonomies to describe which cloud resource generally has which security feature.

10.2 Editor Ontology

The CNL Editor functionality of managing requirements is based on a specific vocabulary, saved in a .owl file (RDF format). CNL Editor allows users, for a selected requirement, to change the Target Value choosing from a predefined list saved in the vocabulary. The use of free text is also allowed in special situations (e.g., where there is a need of a value that cannot be enumerated in the ontology, like an integer number). This way, the user is interactively bound to make changes as defined in the vocabulary.

The CNL Editor vocabulary consists of entities (items) that are defined under *Action* and *Term* classes. Additional actions and terms must be defined as subclasses of these existing classes in any vocabulary that will be created.

In the *CNL Editor*, the *Term* (and its subclasses) is used to instantiate resource types and target values, while the *Action* (and its subclasses) is used to instantiate metrics. Figure 28 shows an example of the vocabulary, with *Action* and *Term* examples highlighted.




Figure 28. CNL Editor Vocabulary Structure Example

In the *CNL Editor* Vocabulary for the MEDINA project, items come from the *Catalogue of controls and metrics*. As anticipated, *Actions* are the Metrics Names and under the *Term* class we can find: i) Resource that contains ResourceTypes, and ii) TargetValue with the TargetValueTypes and values admitted.

For each Metric in the vocabulary, the type of resource and the type of target value associated are specified. The association can be retrieved from the *Catalogue of controls and metrics*.

When editing an obligation, the user is allowed to choose only values defined in the vocabulary. As an example, Figure 29 shows the association of ResourceType and TargetValueType to the Metric named BackupEncriptionEnabled.

Active ontology × Entities × Individuals by class × OWLViz × DL Query × Debugger × Classes Object properties Data properties Annotation properties Datatypes Individuals		BackupEncryptionEnabled — https://cnl-vocabulary-test.k8s.med	ina esilah oro <i>ho</i> cahularies/medina. voc
Class hierarchy: BackupEncryptionEnabled	20808	Annotations Usage	
	Asserted 🕶	Annotations: BackupEncryptionEnabled	2 II S I
Own. Immg Action		Annotations 🛨	
Activity.LogingEnabled AnomalyDetectionEnabled AnomalyDetectionEnabled ApplicationLoggingEnabled		Description BackupEncryptionEnabled	208
AssetManagementPolicy01 AssetManagementPolicy02 AssetManagementPolicy03 AssetManagementPolicy03		Equivalent To (+)	
AutomaticUpdatesEnabled AutomaticUpdatesInabled AutomaticUpdatesInabled ActomaticUpdatesInterval BackupEnabled		SubClass Of (+)	?@×0
BackupEncryptionEnabled BackupMonitoringPolicyCheckQ1 BackupMonitoringPolicyCheckQ2		 hasObject only Boolean hasSubject only Storage 	
BackupMonitoringPolicyCheckQ2 BackupMonitoringPolicyCheckQ3 BackupMonitoringPolicyCheckQ4		PresentableVocabularyItem	7080
BackupMonitoringPolicyCheckQ5		Constal alone aviame	

Figure 29. CNL Editor Vocabulary Metric "BackupEncriptionEnabled"

Figure 30 shows that the TargetValueType is "Boolean".

Active ontology × Entities × Individuals by class × OWLViz × DL Query	× Debugger ×
	Boolean — https://cnl-vocabulary-dev.k8s.medina.esilab.org/vocabularies/medina_vocabula
Class hierarchy: Boolean	Annotations: Boolean 21 - E
🐮 🕵 Asserted 🗸	Annotations +
Owl:Thing Owl:Action PresentableVocabularyItem	rdfs:seeAlso @ 🗴 💿 true,false
	rdfs:isDefinedBy @ 😒 💿 ==
String	Description: Boolean 2118 🗉 🗵
	Equivalent To 🕒
	SubClass Of + TargetValue ? @ × 0

Figure 30. CNL Editor Vocabulary TargetValueType "Boolean"

For TargetValueType "Boolean", the vocabulary defines possible values (true or false) and possible operators that in this case is only "==".

The vocabulary must be defined considering as input what is specified in the *Catalogue of Controls and Metrics* and must be aligned to it.

The MEDINA vocabulary is created and modified via the Protégé³¹ tool, a free, open-source ontology editor, with an easy-to-use GUI.

10.3 Cloud Resource Security Ontology

The Cloud Resource Security Ontology (CRSO) is not directly related to the CNL Editor ontology described above, since these two ontologies serve two different purposes. They do, however, both include a classification of cloud resources.

The Cloud Resource Security Ontology has been developed to harmonise evidence gathering and assessment across certifications, cloud vendors, and resource types. It includes several taxonomies, including a taxonomy of cloud resources and a taxonomy of security properties. As an example, the cloud resource taxonomy includes computing resources which in turn can be virtual machines, containers or functions.

Figure 31 shows the current status of the cloud resource taxonomy. This taxonomy classifies cloud resources across all major cloud providers and architectures, like Microsoft Azure, Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud Platform, and OpenStack. It is ordered by cloud service categories which is the typical classification the major cloud providers also use. For instance, resources that can be used to execute code (virtual machines, serverless functions, etc.) are grouped in a *Compute* category, while resources that provide networking capabilities (virtual networks and subnetworks, IP addresses, routing rules, etc.) pertain to a *Networking* group. The higher-order classes in this taxonomy are the following:

- Compute
- Identity Management
- Container Orchestration

³¹ <u>https://protege.stanford.edu/</u>

- Container Registry
- Continuous Integration/Continuous Delivery Service
- Logging
- Networking
- IoT
- Storage
- Account
- Image

The security properties taxonomy classifies security properties that can configured in a cloud service. We have ordered it by STRIDE categories. STRIDE is an acronym for the security threats Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege. The security properties taxonomy includes their respective counterparts, i.e., the following protection goals:

- Authentication
- Integrity
- Non-repudiation
- Confidentiality
- Availability
- Authorization

The Confidentiality category, for example, includes *encryption* as a security property, while the Integrity category includes the *immutability* property which may be implemented by some storage resources. A further example is presented in Figure 32 and the complete security properties taxonomy is shown in Figure 33.

In particular, Figure 32 shows an excerpt from the CRSO: A BlockStorage is a sub-type of Storage which in turn is a Service. Security properties that are offered on one level of this hierarchy are inherited by child nodes. For instance, Storage offers AtRestEncryption which is inherited by the BlockStorage. Furthermore, BlockStorage offers two specific types of AtRestEncryption, i.e., CustomerManagedKeyEncryption and CPManagedKeyEncryption

Without harmonizing evidence gathering across cloud vendors with the help of Cloud Resource Security Ontology and related taxonomies, processing evidence would be much more tedious, since, e.g., two resources hosted by different cloud providers but with similar security properties have to be parsed by dedicated pieces of code, and measured by dedicated metrics.




Figure 31. The cloud resource taxonomy which classifies cloud resources according to their functional purpose, like compute, storage, and networking






Figure 32. An excerpt from the CRSO

A further advantage of this harmonization is that requirements defined in different certifications or catalogues can be assigned to the ontological concepts they refer to. This assignment to a common ontological classification allows to assess evidence collectively and improves the assessment's reusability and modifiability. The ontological types can therefore be used in metric definitions related to the certifications and catalogues. This way, metrics are defined for abstract resource types, e.g., object storages, and their security properties, e.g., at-rest-encryption, rather than for cloud-provider-specific properties; e.g., an encryption property that is specifically defined for an AWS S3 bucket.

The ontology has been created using Protegé and is published in the online Protegé platform webprotege³². Please note that it has been described and used in the publication *Cloud Property Graph: Connecting Cloud Security Assessments with Static Code Analysis* (IEEE CLOUD 2021) as well, which has been funded by MEDINA [50]. In this publication, the ontology is used as a basis for a combined security analysis of cloud infrastructures and deployed software. Such an analysis similarly requires a harmonisation of security concepts, e.g., encryption or logging functionalities need to be recognised on the infrastructure level as well as on the source code level to allow for a comprehensive assessment of security requirements.

The ontology has been extended multiple times over the course of the project and may be further exploited, for instance it can be used to cover the resource and security properties specified in different certifications and control catalogues.

³² <u>https://webprotege.stanford.edu/#projects/8e5d391e-6436-41c0-b9a9-9226e90a38a9/edit/Classes</u>




Figure 33. The security property taxonomy which classifies security properties according to their targeted STRIDE-based goal

